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ESSAYS

Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall
of Yugoslavia and the Rise of
Multiculturalism in the United States
KENNETH ANDERSON*

"I dont like that part of your letter wherein you say you had
the Testimonies of well doing in your Breast, whenever such
motions rise again endeavour to suppress em ...."'**
* B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1983; J.D., Harvard, 1986; associate adjunct
professor of law, Fordham Law School, New York; lecturer in law, Harvard Law School,
1993-94; member of the editorial boards of Telos and The Journalof Terrorism and Political
Violence.
This essay is based in large part on the author's experiences monitoring human rights in the
former Yugoslavia on behalf of Human Rights Watch. It is written, however, solely in the
author's personal and academic capacity, and his views are not attributable to Human Rights
Watch or its Helsinki Watch division. The author wishes to thank Edward DuMont, Mary
Ann Glendon, Gerald Marzorati, Aryeh Neier, Paul Piccone, David Rapoport, David Rieff,
John Ryle, Fred Siegel, Jean-Marie Simon, Lawrence Solum and Henry Steiner for
conversations contributing substantially to parts of this essay. None of them, however, is
responsible for anything said here and each surely disagrees with a great deal of it.
The author also thanks the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law of the
University of Virginia Law School and its officers for the opportunity to present an early
version of this paper at its February 1993 Symposium on Eastern Europe.
This essay is affectionately dedicated to Aryeh Neier and Paul Piccone--two of the last
intellectuals in New York who still believe in argument on the merits.
** The young Edmund Burke to his Quaker friend Richard Shackleton, November 1, 1744.
Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented
Anthology of Edmund Burke 25 (1992) (spelling as in original) (Burke expressing distrust of
those confident of the "inner light" and their own virtue).
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THE BAD DREAM

Journalistic and scholarly accounts of the breakup of Yugoslavia
contain, taken together, a curious contradiction.
On the one hand, it is said, Yugoslavia was never anything more
than a "bad dream,"' a flawed attempt to unify "from above" 2 peoples who have historically hated one another. The immediate causes
of the conflict are therefore simply centuries-old ethnic hatreds.3 The
veneer of Yugoslav federal unity was nothing more than a myth, a
cosmetic surface stripped away in a trifling by deeper and darker
enmities. There are old scores to settle whether dating from the Second World War or from the fourteenth century Battle of Kosovo.
This essay aims to demonstrate that the Yugoslav war is partly the
result of a contradiction between a state-sponsored system of-paradoxically-tolerance for historical ethnic divisions, and an effort to
make the individual the proper juridical object of the state. Despite
certain modernist appearances to the contrary, Yugoslavia had created a system of pre-modern ethnic power balancing as between
national communities to maintain order. With the fall of communism
and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the most serious
external restraints on Yugoslav ethnic nationalism were removed, the
internal contradiction asserted itself, and the consequences are only
too apparent.
But if, as this initial view of the war asserts, the morass of the
Balkans is one of fundamentally ancient ethnic conflict, then outsiders
are cautioned against intervention. 4 What could possibly be set right
1. To employ the phrase of one bitter Serb refugee, "Yugoslavia was just a bad dream."
Tony Horwitz, Balkan Death Trip, Harper's Magazine, Mar. 1993, at 38.
2. See Paul Shoup, Crisis and Reform in Yugoslavia, 79 Telos 129 (1989).
3. As The Economist put it:
The people of the Balkans are fired by hatreds that go back centuries. Roman
Catholics have been fighting Orthodox Christians there since 1221; Serbs remember
their defeat at the hands of Turks in 1389 as though it were yesterday. Though the
tribes are intermingled, and sometimes intermarried, the intensity of ethnic and
religious rivalry has not diminished, nor has the ferocity with which it is expressed.
Into Bosnia, The Economist, July 4, 1992, at 14. The article then goes on to quote a cautionary report from The Economist itself of how outsiders can get bogged down intervening in
Bosnia-Hercegovina-but datelined 1879, referring to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Id.
4. The Clinton administration, in its strongly ad hoc approach to foreign policy, appears to
have accepted this view and its noninterventionist corollary at certain key moments during
1993. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Bosnia Reconsidered: Where Candidate Clinton Saw a
Challenge The President Sees an Insoluble Quagmire, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al ("[The
Clinton administration has] begun to talk about Bosnia differently, to cast the problem there
less as a moral tragedy - which would make American inaction immoral - and more as a
tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle.").
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in a conflict far older than, for example, the United States itself?. It is
merely New World hubris to think otherwise. 5 The United States
thus should take its cue from the Europeans who, understanding the
current strife as simply the latest in an unfinished series of Balkan
wars, have wisely declined to become involved militarily.6
This view of the Yugoslav crisis as rooted in history has a corollary,
latent in the diplomacy of the Western capitals and explicit in the
former Yugoslavia. Given the enmity that for a time lay quietly like
lava under the mantle of rock, but which now spews forth in a volcanic eruption, it is better, once open war has begun, to give up the
dream of co-existence and to separate altogether-not just governments, but whole peoples. If ethnic cleansing is not completed now,
then the failure to complete it will inevitably trigger another conflict.
Aleksa Djilas is at his clearest, most sober, and most insistent on this
point. He says, with respect to Serbs and Croats, that "[tihe sensible
and fair solution to the problem of the Serbian-held territories of Croatia would be for Serbs to allow these regions to be reincorporated
into Croatia, and for Croats to grant the Serbs considerable autonomy
in them."7 Djilas then observes sadly that:
5. The historian Paul Johnson, writing in The Spectator, is more blunt:
One of the great diplomatic lessons of the 19th century is that the great powers
should not waste too much time on the Balkans. The problems of the Balkans are
infinitely complex and ultimately insoluble because they are rooted in the nature of
the inhabitants themselves.... Short of exterminating them, there is really nothing
to be done... [The Balkans led to the first world war, thus ending a century of
general peace, primarily because all the senseless fretting had convinced the powers
that this miserable part of the world mattered. Needless to say, the Balkan peoples,
or I should say their political 61ites, loved to be the centre of the world drama ....
Mhey still do.... [Tihey do not mind the world hating them. What they cannot
bear is being ignored....
It is hard to get such elementary geopolitical facts of life into the heads of ignorant
people like President Clinton and John Major.
Paul Johnson, Don't count Balkan raindrops, look out for the eastern typhoon, The Spectator (London), May 22, 1993, at 20.
6. The Economist, a newspaper not ordinarily shy about taking moral positions, has argued
sharply against outside military intervention in Bosnia:
Although it is not Belsen in Bosnia, and will probably never be, it is certainly beyond
Kristallnacht.
At times like these the heart says intervene, and damn the persnickety details. But
the head must have its say as well.
...There is a world of difference between rescuing a viable country from foreign
aggression and pacifying a non-country that has collapsed into tribal warfare.
Into Bosnia, The Economist, Aug. 15, 1992, at 12.
7. Aleksa Djilas, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia; Book Review, The New
Republic, Jan. 25, 1993, at 42.
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The mood of intransigent nationalism that now rules both
groups makes such a settlement very unlikely....
In our century more often than at any other time in
history, ethnic groups have been forced by other groups
with which they have once lived to flee their territories.
They have hardly ever returned ....
Only direct and permanent military occupation can
ensure that hostile populations will peacefully coexist on the
same territory....
[The absence of military occupation] leaves only the
"solution" of partition .... A house divided against itself
cannot stand, and only rarely can it be reunited, but it can
be transformed into separate and livable homes.8
Thus, goes the corollary, if there is to be any long-term, historical
benefit from this slaughter, it must be the completion of ethnic cleansing, the complete separation of peoples, so that there will be no occasion to go at it again in the future.
Harsh as this view is, and unwilling as the moralists, legalists and
even feminists of the West are to countenance it, it says simply that
once the slaughter has begun, it is better to finish it. 9 Anything else
invites a repeat performance. Whether or not this view is morally or
legally correct, it follows its own historical logic if one accepts that
this, the Third Balkan War, 10 is nothing less than the massive, geologic conjunction of pre-modern ethnic hatreds unleashed when modernist institutions failed.
Another view lives uneasily with the above argument, however.
Journalists writing anecdotally about the former Yugoslavia have
remarked how Serbs and Croats, especially, did live side by side.
They intermingled, intermarried, and seemingly paid less and less
attention to ethnicity in daily life over the course of the post-war
...

8. Id.

9. For the definitive moralist and legalist view of the conflict, see generally Helsinki Watch
(division of Human Rights Watch), War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. I, Aug. 1992, and
vol. II, Apr. 1993. Volume I publishes a list of nine senior Serb commanders and political
leaders who, in the view of Helsinki Watch, deserve to be indicted for war crimes. Volume II
formally charges Serb forces with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and,
unlike most other public pronouncements of such charges, backs them up with the most
thorough investigation to date of crimes in the former Yugoslavia by all parties to the conflict
carried out by any organization, governmental or non-governmental.
10. As Misha Glenny calls it, thus emphasizing the war's historical antecedents. See Misha
Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (1992).
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decades.11 It is not as if people living in Yugoslavia during the postwar period got up each morning to think about "the national question" in Yugoslavia. This intermingling and co-existence went on for
several generations. For that matter, it is not as if the previous centuries were one long unbroken war either. For all of the conflicts that
have made the Balkans the Balkans, during most of the time the tribes
in the land of Yugoslavia lived in peace.' 2 Tony Horwitz's account is
typical:
"Until a few years ago," the husband said softly, "we never
thought about who was Serb and who was Croat. Now we
are told it makes all the difference if you light a white candle
in church instead of a yellow candle, or cross yourself with
3
three fingers instead of two.'
Jeri Laber, writing with long experience in Yugoslavia as executive
director of the Helsinki Watch division of Human Rights Watch,
makes the same point. "'Before the war it was super,' a thirty-fiveyear-old Serbian woman, a refugee from Vares, told me without hesitation. 'My neighbors were Muslims, Croats. We celebrated all the
holidays together.' ""i Later, Laber quotes a young Muslim man
whose wife was raped "before his eyes by a Serb whom he knew.""5
"'Yesterday we were friends... I shake when I think of it.... We
knew these people; we knew them all. Overnight we became enemies.
I don't know why.' "16
II.

INTERVENTION AND GENOCIDE

In fact, the amount of intermingling between tribes other than the
Serbs and Croats was always far less than may be supposed. The
11. Roger Cohen, writing in The New York Times, says that "[t]he best estimate is that close
to 15 percent of marriages in the former Yugoslavia were mixed." Roger Cohen, The Tearing
Apart of Yugoslavia: Place by Place, Family by Family, N.Y. Tunes, May 9, 1993, § 4, at 4.
The percentage of those intermarriages between Serbs and Croats was higher still.
12. As pointed out, for example, by Sabrina Petra Ramet, War in the Balkans, 71 Foreign
Aff. 79, 80 (Fall 1992).
13. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 38. See also Slavenka Drakulic, Between War and Peace:
Living With Fear in Zagreb, The Nation, June 15, 1992, at 816, 817 ("[Bosnia,] where Croats,
Muslims and Serbs live so mixed together that they call it 'leopard skin.' "); Charles Lane,
Besieged: Sarajevo Postcard, The New Republic, July 27, 1992, at 30; Charles Lane,
Survivors: Croatia Postcard, The New Republic, Jan. 25, 1993, at 9.
14. Jeri Laber, Bosnia: Questions About Rape, The New York Review of Books, Mar. 25,
1993, at 3, 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Albanians of Kosovo, for example, were always a people apart. 7
There is also a certain panglossian desperation among some Western
journalists to plead to the West the multi-ethnic, liberal character of
Sarajevan society in defense of the Bosnian presidency against those
who would subdivide Bosnia and be done with it. To listen to them,
indeed, Sarajevo was the multicultural, tolerant, pluralist Western
Mecca that New York and Los Angeles so evidently are not."s
Yet recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a separate country was
largely done as a ploy-an honorable ploy, but a ploy-to try and
preserve the peace. 19 Surely there is something to the arguments

espoused, not only by Serbs and Croats, but also by Vance and
Owen,20 that once it became evident that the peace would not be
maintained after the recognition of Bosnia, then Bosnia's weeks-old
independent status became, in the attempt to find a lasting peace,
open to question. One would have to be a formidable legal formalist
to reject the argument out of hand and say that Bosnia's integrity, in
the midst of a war over borders, was as sacrosanct as, say, Switzerland's. Western journalists show a tendency, moved by the plight of
Bosnia's Muslims and the crimes of the Serb (and other) forces, to
dismiss out of hand the substance of the Serb position over borders;
they can see the abhorrent situation on the ground, but have little idea
17. See generally Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History,
Politics 31-59 (1984); Dimitrije Bogdanovi6, The Kosovo Question: Past and Present (1985);
Helsinki Watch & International Helsinki Federation, Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo (1990);
Studies on Kosovo (Arshi Pipa & Sami Repishti eds., 1984).
18. See, e.g., Christopher Hitchens, Why Bosnia Matters: Appointment in Sarajevo, The
Nation, Sept. 14, 1992, at 236, 240. Hitchens is careful to begin by saying "[t]here is no need
to romanticize the Muslim majority in Bosnia," but he then proceeds to do exactly that with
the strange praise that being a practicing Muslim makes one "an exception among" Bosnian
Muslims. Id. The conspicuous failure of New York and Los Angeles, however, makes one
wonder whether this vision of Sarajevo is not an instance of the liberal-left inventing for itself
yet another land of redemption, after the tarnishing of Nicaragua by elections in which the
bless&l lost.
19. For an indignant defense of the idea of a unitary Bosnia contrary to the current VanceOwen cantonization plan, see Anthony Borden & Richard Caplan, Ratifying Aggression in
Bosnia: Recipe for a Wider War, The Nation, Oct. 12, 1992, at 381. Borden and Caplan
essentially argue against the view espoused in The Economist, see supra note 6, that there is a
difference between rescuing a viable country and pacifying a non-country. Glenny puts the
dilemma thus: "Of all the entities making up the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia boasts the longest
history as a definable state, kingdom or republic. None the less its internal stability was
invariably guaranteed by an external power which mediated between the three [Serb, Croat,
and Muslim] communities ...." Glenny, supra note 10, at 143-44.
20. "At a conference this July in Washington sponsored by the U.S. Institute for Peace,
Herbert Okun, a top aide to U.N. special envoy on Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance, dismissed the
idea that there has ever been a historic ideal of Bosnian nationhood to maintain." Borden &
Caplan, supra note 19, at 395.
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how the border situation came to be.2"
I favor, by contrast, sharp and unabashed NATO action against

Serb forces, in Serbia proper as well as in Bosnia, with all the weight
of the West's machine of war to suppress the massive violations of the
laws of war committed mostly by Serb forces (although, at this writing, the Croats are racing to catch up). But I do not think the debate
over borders, the casus beii, is clear-cut at all. More exactly, while
not agreeing that the border dispute or supposed safety of Serb minorities justified resort to force, I also do not think the Serbs' argument
absurd that internal borders set and reset by a communist dictator
ought not automatically to command legitimacy. What must be
rejected entirely, however, is the view that Serbs have some "right of
self-determination" to live in a Serb state. The present-day promulgation of this type of argument exposes the folly of attempting to give
content to ethnic or tribally based self-determination" as a "right,"
and, worst of all, the folly of linking the self-determination of groups
to individualist human rights.23
Violations of international humanitarian law, committed largely by
Serb forces and now by the Croats and, to a lesser extent, by Muslim
forces, fall into two broad categories-ethnic cleansing, and war
crimes committed as part of an overall plan of ethnic cleansing. The
first, ethnic cleansing, is an impermissible end of warfare. Mass
deportations and relocation of civilian populations are outlawed by
21. Current positions of American journalists, and pundits on Bosnia and the war generally,
are found in Gary J. Bass, Swing Kids: The Post-Cold War Balkan Dance, The New
Republic, Apr. 5, 1993, at 17. For a view that the Serbs had good reasons to expect a
readjustment of borders, see Edward Pearce, Commentary, Lessons for the War Party, The
Guardian, Aug. 12, 1992, at 16.
If multi-confessional Yugoslavia exists Bosnia can exist, otherwise not....
...The Serbs were entitled to a far more sympathetic understanding of their
objections to a flimsy Bosnia with Croatians and Germans standing behind it and to
the loss to Serbia of the 34 per cent Serbian population of Bosnia.
Behind the subterfuge of outrage, we now risk being dragged ... into dropping
bombs to sustain the effective status quo of 1941 [Le., a status quo created by Hitler].
Id.
22. This includes the so-called "wars of national liberation" enshrined in international law
during the Third World heyday of the 1970s. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, art. 1(4), reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391 (1977) (on wars of national liberation)
[hereinafter Protocol I]. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia are all fighting for "national liberation"
by those terms.
23. See the powerful article by Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary, 71 Foreign Aff. 79
(Winter 1992/93); for contrary views, see generally The Rights of Peoples (James Crawford
ed., 1988).
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the laws of war.24 As for the second broad category, the method of
warfare by which ethnic cleansing is generally being undertaken in
Bosnia-siege and starvation-is prohibited as a means of warfare. 25
There is then a long list of particular war crimes, including murder,
rape and torture, falling under these two headings.2 6 Armed intervention to suppress either of these large, systematic categories of violations is legally permissible, in my view and in the view of Human
Rights Watch, as a matter of the enforcement of international humanitarian law.27
Actual intervention, however, should not only be legally permissible, but should also satisfy the traditional criteria of the just war,
including prudence, likelihood of success, and benefits outweighing
costs. These are political and moral criteria to be applied by political
leaders, and not simply legal ones.2 8 These criteria are met, I believe,
at least with respect to humanitarian aid and other action to relieve
the sieges of Sarajevo and other Bosnian Muslim towns.
The broader point is that intervention often means going to war,
which in a democracy is necessarily a political as well as legal decision. No one who adopts positions based strictly on legality, such as
human rights organizations, is in a position to tell political leaders
that they must go to war. At most, they can say that there are permissible legal grounds to go to war. The exception to this might be
genocide, the circumstance where "the moral imperative to intervene
might indeed sweep all else before it."2 9
Unsurprisingly, therefore, those legalists already favoring intervention in Bosnia are also discovering a case of genocide in what is, thus
far, a thoroughly American-style instance of result-oriented jurisprudence. Perhaps it can be shown-I am not averse to such a finding.30
24. Indeed, "unlawful deportation or transfer" is a grave breach-meaning individually
criminally liable-under the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949. Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Similar protection is found at article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, the willful violation of which is made a grave breach by article 85(4)(a) of
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention. See Protocol I, supra note 22.
25. See War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 9, vol. II, app. G, at 420, for
"Relevant International Law As It Applies to Siege Warfare and Its Aims in the Current
Conflict"; see also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations 160 (2d ed. 1992) ("War Against Civilians: Sieges and Blockades").
26. See generally War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 9, vol. II, at 7, for a
discussion of these crimes in international humanitarian law.
27. Id. at 4.
28. See generally the preface to Walzer, supra note 25.
29. Into Bosnia, The Economist, Aug. 15, 1992, at 13.
30. Human Rights Watch's recent report, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 9,
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To the best of my knowledge, however, no one to date has clearly
made the argument, applying law to facts, and in particular dealing
with the issue of intent, that what has gone on in Bosnia thus far
constitutes genocide within the strict meaning of the Genocide Convention.3 1 Using the word without making a convincing case cheapens it.
Nor does it much advance the argument to say that genocide can be
a means to the end of ethnic cleansing. Of course genocide can be a
means to an end, but for a means to count as genocide, it must still
satisfy the definitional requirement that it be done with the intent of
destroying the group, in whole or in part, as such. It is not transparent that having the intent forcibly to relocate a group in order to take
its land, even by killing large numbers of the group as a means of
forcing it to move, is the same as having the intent to destroy the
group as such, in whole or in part. Those killed, even in great numbers, are not necessarily killed with the intent of destroying the group
in whole or even in part. It seems at least possible, and rather more
likely, that they are killed with the intent of, or collateral to, making
them and the rest of the group move.
The point is that the intent or motive lying behind the killing cannot be determined solely on the basis of the fact of killing. The
method of killing (for example, are members of the group hunted
down or are they allowed an "out" provided they move?) is surely
relevant as evidence of intent and motivation, but the mere fact of
murder, the killing, is not. The killing is what is to be explained; it is
not an explanation of intent. And certainly it can be a genocidal
intent; if, for example, the group absolutely refuses to leave and their
voL II, at 2, flatly announces that "what is taking place in Bosnia-Hercegovina is attempted
genocide." This is a serious charge to level on the second page of a 422 page report, only to
find that nowhere in the remainder of the report is the law of genocide mentioned, much less
applied to these facts. It is a remarkable oversight in an otherwise remarkable report-the best
report that anyone has prepared to date-and suggests that Human Rights Watch was not
really prepared to make the case.
31. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Republic of Bosnia-

Hercegovina submitted an application to the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") asking
for a finding of genocide against its people by Serb forces and seeking injunctive relief. See
generally Stephen Kinzer, Belgrade is Urged to Control Serbs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1993, at

A5, col. 1. My own reading of the Bosnian submission to the ICJ was that it failed to make the
crucial showing of intent required for genocide. The ICY issued an ambiguous ruling, ordering
parties to the conflict not to engage in acts of genocide but not indicating whether it thought
any had taken place. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Apr. 8, 1993,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 888 (1993). Both sides claimed victory on the basis of the holding.
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attacker then decides to gain the land by destroying the group in
whole or in part, as such. That is a different intent and a different
situation, however, and it has to be shown.
These distinctions in intent and motivation are elementary in criminal law, and particularly in American death penalty jurisprudence.
The fact that they have not so far been applied strikes me as good
reason to see the genocide argument as a jurisprudence of result. It is
an attempt to rewrite the definition of genocide as found in the Genocide Convention conveniently to exclude the intent requirement that
distinguishes genocide from all other crimes. This seems particularly
untenable given that the Nuremberg Charter established a crime corresponding precisely to forcible relocation, extermination, and deportation, without genocide's extra intent requirement, and called it
"crimes against humanity. ' 32
As of this writing, crimes against humanity are all that have been
proved. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia presents, however, a sufficient
threat of genocide that the Security Council, pursuant to article VIII
of the Genocide Convention, ought to take "appropriate" action "for
the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. ' 33 But that is not
the same as concluding that genocide is going on or has gone on or
has been attempted.
This is not to say that genocide can occur only where there are gas
chambers and millions upon millions killed and a "smoking gun"
written plan of extermination of the group as such. In my view, the
perhaps 40,000 or so killed in the Anfal campaign of Iraqi Kurdistan
meet the requirements of genocide, but only because the work has
been done there to bring forward the necessary evidence and to connect it to genocidal intent, rather than tacitly rewriting the definition
in the Genocide Convention to remove the inconvenience of showing
the required intent.34 In any case, the ICJ ought to defer the Bosnian
dispute pending proceedings of the war crimes tribunal for former
Yugoslavia that the Security Council has moved to establish under
32. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. For Human Rights Watch's summary view of the elements of crimes against
humanity, see War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 9, vol. II, app. A, at 394.
33. Genocide Convention, supra note 31, art. VIII.
34. Middle East Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, is preparing a genocide case
against Iraq for its treatment of the Kurds, which it hopes will be brought by a government in
the ICI; it has spent a year and a half preparing principally to prove the "intent" requirement
of genocide. The contrast with the loose charges of genocide in Bosnia could not be greater.
See Middle East Watch, division of Human Rights Watch, & Physicians for Human Rights,
The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruction of Koreme (1993).
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Security Council Resolution 808. That tribunal would be in far
greater possession of the facts on which to make a determination.
Lurking behind these concepts of intervention, war versus
policework, just war, legally permissible war, the definition of genocide and the legally and morally required response to it is a much
deeper question of how to conceive the political community that is
called upon to respond. On the one hand, it can be conceived as the
"world community," the internationalists' dream of a world order
that responds to disorder by analogy with the domestic rule of law.
This conception corresponds closely with the idea that intervention in
Bosnia is policework. I have already suggested that this characterization is wrong as a practical and factual matter. In an activity as drastic as warfare, practice and the facts ought to (and indeed do) control
the legal characterization of the activity and not the other way
around: parties that fight wars are bound by the rules of war, and not
by the rules of policework, even if the abstract, legal reasons for their
interventions might plausibly be characterized as neutral law
enforcement.
But this very vision of policework is fundamentally one of a unitary
world community. It requires a strong, and in my view, quite wrong
assumption that the world is, and ought to be, evolving toward a
global unity based on the supranational rule of law, and that this is
the only way in the long run to guarantee fundamental human rights
and international security. This enticing vision of a single world community flies in the face, however, of the evidence of how, in fact, the
enforcement of international law takes place in matters of war and
peace, which is at most multilateralist rather than supranationalist.
Proponents of the supranational rule of law are thereby reduced to
arguing that their vision is how it ought to be and that this constitutes
"progress." I remain skeptical.
But the corollary to this vision of a unitary world community-a
disturbing corollary-is that nations are presumed to act parochially
at best and indeed, in the face of such moral outrages as Bosnia, morally badly if they ask why their soldiers, their sons, should die for the
sake of another. This is not a question police are allowed to ask, they
are there to enforce the law. To suggest, for example, that a nation
ought to have an "interest" at stake before sending its soldiers to fight
and die, and that this is something one owes one's soldiers and their
families, is impliedly bad moral form--"isolationism," sneer the Bosnia pundit-hawks-because it questions the idea that the world is, or
ought to be, a unitary community. It isn't supposed to matter whose
soldiers die so long as they do it for the universal moral law. One is
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not supposed to question the privilege of dying for Kant and Perpetual Peace.35
The idea that this abstract Kantianism is the highest form of justice
and morality has been sharply criticized with respect to individuals,
but it remains an article of faith among internationalists, along with a
closely related article of faith that internationalism is a necessary
foundation for the protection of human rights.
But it is not the only ground for intervention, nor the most attractive. A world made up of different, sometimes radically different,
political communities still leaves open the possibility of intervention,
unilaterally or multilaterally, on the basis of interests, in some cases,
and even pure altruism in others. And this model preserves what everyone save the hardened internationalists regards as essential questions in intervention-what are the interests of my political
community at stake and what are the possible costs to my political
community, including the deaths of my soldiers? There is no apology
made for "mine" and "ours."
It is no accident that the most persuasive secular argument for just
war theory in the post-war decades, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust
Wars, proceeds from an assumption of separate political communities
rather than from true internationalism.36 Just war theory depends
deeply on the existence of differing political communities with differing interests who must make decisions of why, when, and how to
fight; true internationalism effectively jettisons traditional just war criteria because one fights solely for "the law." This is not, I suggest,
something to admire in internationalism and, still more telling, it does
not correspond to the practical condition of intervention, which is
war and not policework. Much of the tragic confusion of roles-soldier or policeman-in Somalia under United Nations supervision
today arises from this deeper confusion over vision.
This is not to say that separate political communities cannot justify
fighting except on the basis of interests. While European intervention
in Bosnia would be, to my mind, principally a matter of interests,
United States intervention-plainly there is room to disagree, and
many pundit-hawks have done so 37-would be principally a matter of
35. I follow here Michael Walzer's lead in Just and Unjust Wars. See Walzer, supra note
25, at 237 (state leaders "are not required to calculate as if every human life carried the same
moral weight for every decision-maker at every moment in time. Their people's lives are not
international resources to be distributed in war so as to balance the risks or reduce the losses of
other people.").
36. Id.

37. See, e.g., Dennis DeConcini, Bomb the Serbs. Now., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1993, at A21
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altruism. The difference between going to war based on interests and
going to war based on altruism is, in a democracy, a question of what
level of support must be garnered for the decision. Where interests
are at stake, then the usual combination of elite decision-making and
some level of popular support is sufficient; this is what the elites are
there for. Where intervention is a matter of altruism, however, then a
higher level of societal consensus ought to be reached before risking
the lives of our soldiers. In my view, this is a moral precondition for
intervention in Bosnia, and not just a fact of U.S. political life
lamented by hardened internationalists. The case for intervention can
be made to the American people, and ought to be made-but it has
not so far been made.
III.

RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY

The turnabout from neighbors to enemies in the former Yugoslavia
is grimly astonishing. In the case of rape used as a method of warfare,
"enemies" does not begin to grasp what has gone on, and I am at a
loss for the right word. Consider Jeri Laber's sober observation: "All
too frequently the aggressors were known to the victim: 'They were
our neighbors' is a common refrain. ' 38 How does one describe a former neighbor raping the woman next door-as though he had never
known her and she were from another planet, or because he had
known her and now she was from another planet? Words fail. 9
("Those who are urging no involvement may sound like they are giving wise counsel. In fact,
they are advocating a policy that is much riskier to our national security.").
38. Laber, supra note 14, at 4.
39. Words do not fail, however, when it comes to assessing the contributions of University
of Michigan law professor Catharine MacKinnon to promoting the rule of law in the former
Yugoslavia. Professor MacKinnon has, in my estimation, done more than any single person to
trivialize the issue of rape as a method of warfare in this conflict-particularly through her use
of specious statistics. To judge by Professor MacKinnon's remarks at the panel discussion on
Bosnia at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on April 7, 1993, as I understood
them, she is disappointed to find that rape is indeed a crime in international humanitarian law;
to discover that it was not might better suit her particular theories of victimization-although
not, to be sure, the interests of her clients, who might have been better advised to seek counsel
with some regard for their interests and a more modest agenda. See generally Aryeh Neier,
Watching Rights, The Nation, Mar. 1, 1993, at 259; Letters (MacKinnon reply, Neler
response), The Nation, May 3, 1993, at 578.
Rather than ensuring that rape is treated as a war crime as serious as murder, enslavement,
extermination, and other such crimes, Professor MacKinnon and a few other American
feminists seem far more interested-viewing all the world through the ethno-prism of
America's domestic "culture wars"--in prising rape in Bosnia from the category of war crimes
and putting it instead on a continuum with sexual harassment in the workplace and the sexual
proclivities of Senator Bob Packwood. After a certain point, of course, one runs out of things
to say to those, like Professor MacKinnon, who cannot be overly bothered with the facts
because they prefer the Big Metaphor. However, even some in the popular press are beginning
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At another kind of extreme is the case of the Serb paterfamilias
who, on the outbreak of war, went home and shot and killed his Croat
wife and daughter.' He was apparently unable to bear the idea (if
any "explanation" can be put upon such madness) that by marrying a
Croat, he had put himself outside the tribe, so to speak. Equally crucially, he had no other identity, no identity given to him by modernity, with which to counter-balance his sudden, horrifying discovery
of "outsideness." Neither individual identity nor identity with his
family was enough to save him or them.
We may wonder-we should wonder-from what motive did this
man act? From guilt at having betrayed his tribe? From shame? If
there is any psychodynamic to be found in this case, surely what is
present here, and across the behavior of the whole tribe, is a deep
revulsion at having lived together "with [such] animals," as one of
Horwitz's Serb interviewees put it.4 ' This is, above all, the shame of
miscegenation. It is a sense of uncleanliness, of shame at having
touched and commingled and copulated and reproduced (consensually, and not as rape) with the "other thing" that is unclean. It is
unease and it is anxiety. It is also a feeling of guilt at having experienced pleasure in spilling seed outside the tribe.
This guilt and revulsion is deeply irrational, or more precisely, prerational. The irrationality runs deep in the behavior of the tribes, and
it runs particularly deep in those who live on the boundaries of the
tribe, who have had that much more opportunity for contamination
with "the other." It is not necessarily true that contact with "the
to get worried about the cheapening of "rape" as a meaningful term; see, e.g., Katie Roiphe,
Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1993, § 6 (magazine) at 26 ("In their claims
of a date-rape epidemic on campus, feminists subvert their own cause."). The contrast
between Professor MacKinnon's metaphors, big and small, and the sober, careful, and
ultimately more moving-because there is reason to think it true-account by Jeri Laber in
The New York Review of Books could not be greater. See supra note 14.
40. This event was recounted to me by Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of Human Rights
Watch, following a February 1993 visit to the former Yugoslavia. For such situations more
broadly, see Glenny, supra note 10, at 90.
[J]ournalists [in Glina, Croatia] came across mixed marriages... which had been
split by the war. One female Croat soldier on the front line south of Sisak ...told
reporters how she had joined the National Guard when her husband signed up for
the local Serb paramilitaries. She explained without bitterness how she was now
firing at her husband. Many marriages have been wrecked by the war, although I
observed a general pattern in the crisis areas of women assimilating the national
consciousness of their husbands: Croat women espousing the Serb ideals of their
partners and Serb women denouncing Serb aggression against the homeland of their
lovers.
Id.
41. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 38.

1993]

ILLIBERAL TOLERANCE

other" produces a relaxation of taboos. On the contrary, those on the
tribal boundaries may, when the moment comes for a declaration of
tribal loyalty, assert tribal ties all the more strongly, even if tribal
loyalty requires killing one's mate and offspring.
Unfortunately, adherence to tribe is not simply a matter of irrationality. Once the process of killing and ethnic cleansing is seriously
underway, then no rational person can afford to live outside the tribe,
regardless of how indifferent that individual may be to tribal affinity.
It is simply a matter of safety, and thus rational considerations lead to
the completion of ethnic cleansing. The process may begin by the
actions of irrational tribalists, but it is completed by individuals
rationally seeking safety.
Likewise, the process of commercialized ethnic cleansing currently
underway in the property market between Serbia and Croatia demonstrates rational behavior in the midst of irrational conflict. Individuals and families seek to exchange roughly equal pieces of property in
order to put themselves in the proper tribal territory. It is less bloody
and more sullen than the experience of the Muslims being driven from
Bosnia under siege, but the purpose is fundamentally the same. "So it
seemed simple enough: swap homes and land and furniture, and live
with your own.... But the result was the same: ethnic cleansing. 42
IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM INVENTION AND MODERNITY
The tension between the fact that these peoples of Yugoslavia had
supposedly quarreled violently with one another for practically forever, as The Economist or the historian Paul Johnson has suggested,43
and yet had lived peacefully together for several generations is evident. This contradiction requires an explanation which shows the
mechanism by which the tribes lived together in relative peace and
indeed intermingled during the post-war period. It must then show
why the mechanism broke down so completely.
One might simply reject the idea of "mechanisms," at least modernist ones, altogether. According to this view, ethnic strife follows
its own historical logic, rising and falling across the centuries in a
rhythm as indifferent to modernist mechanisms of control as the tides.
In the Balkans at least, pre-modem ethnicity is primary, and modem
individualist identity is only secondary. It is modernist hubris, the
argument goes, to look for material mechanisms of control that failed
42. Id. See also Anna Husarska, Fire Sale: Serbian Bargain Hunting, The New Republic,
Dec. 23, 1992, at 13.
43. Into Bosnia, supra note 3; Johnson, supra note 5.
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and then to wonder why they failed since they simply have little to do
with the real issue of ethnicity. It is like solemnly debating why the
sandcastle at the shore failed to hold back the tide.
The attraction of this explanation is its simplicity, but of course it
leaves unexplained why ethnicity is primary here and not everywhere,
and it leaves completely unexplained the interior logic of ethnic
upheaval across the centuries. Ultimately it is not satisfying because
it mystifies, rather than explains. This explanation remains a useful
beginning point, however, because it cautions against the idea that
modem institutions, because they are modem, automatically play a
role in controlling and revising pre-modem impulses. It is a useful
caution against the presumption that the modem, rather than the premodem, is primary, or that it even necessarily matters. Perhaps
under some circumstances the modem hardly matters at all, and perhaps the Third Balkan War is one of those circumstances.
This caution is particularly appropriate given that the fashionable
discourse on ethnic conflict today stresses that it originates in the
deliberate actions of modem actors aiming at modern ends. Fashionable discourse on ethnic conflict is often strikingly ahistorical, typically seeking to pin it on the actions of living politicians, or the media,
or some actor who is modem, accessible, and did not live two hundred years ago. Ethnic conflict, in the breathless title of a recent
cover story, is "invented" rather than endemic, thus stressing its contingent and modem character.' In fact it is a point well taken. Sri
Lanka appears to be a case in point and so, for that matter, is the case
of religious strife in India.45 The case that modem ethnic conflict is
invented on the basis of radical revisions of historical narratives is
most persuasively put by Amartya Sen; and his account is persuasive
precisely because it is historically argued:
Hindu extremist groups have been recently busy "reconstructing" Indian history.., playing down the Muslim contribution to Indian history .... If the Hindu middle classes
in some parts of India have suddenly become more aware of
alleged misdeeds of Muslim rulers in the past, this is not
because new historical facts have just been discovered. It is
because Hindu political activists have been trying to re-cre44. Susanne Rudolph & Lloyd Rudolph, Modem Hate: How Ancient Animosities Get
Invented, The New Republic, Mar. 22, 1993, at 24.
45. Id. See also William McGowan, Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka (1992);

Anthony Spaeth, Inventing an Ethnic Rivalry: Sri Lanka's civil war has political, not
historical roots, Harper's Magazine, Nov. 1991, at 67.
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ate a mythical past, mixing fact with fantasy. The idea that
retributive justice can be sought now for the past misdeeds
of Muslim kings, by compromising the civil status of contemporary Indian Muslims, is not only ethically grotesque,
it is also historically preposterous."
Sen's tone is striking. It is the tone of a modernist, a citizen of the
Enlightenment, asserting that there are facts of history that can be
known, that some historical accounts are correct and others are incorrect and that this matters. Those he battles in his article, by contrast,
are neither modem nor, curiously, even pre-modern. They bear a
peculiar relationship to post-modernism in their willingness to
rewrite, not history per se, but its narratives. Their fundamentalism,
as noted by writers in the Fundamentalism Project of the University
of Chicago, engages in "selective retrieval" from the past, which is a
device of post-modernism, as is their willingness consciously to
reinvent the narratives of history to fit agendas that would be
unrecognizable to the actual traditionalists of the past.47
This selective retrieval is, above all, the conscious election of one
item of tradition but not another. In other words, it is the conscious
reconstruction of the telling of history. It is the conscious selection,
and then the utter refusal to acknowledge once the selection is done
the conscious nature of that act, that makes it so dangerous and so
maddening to the modernist mentality. It seems a strange thing to
characterize, for example, Islamic fundamentalists and Hindu funda46. Amartya. Sea, The Threats to Secular India, The New York Review of Books, Apr. 8,
1993, at 26, 30. While in complete agreement with Sen that the idea is ethically terrible, I do
not know why he considers it so grotesque. After all, it requires only the same logic as one of
the standard justifications (wrong in my view, but standard) for affirmative action in the
United States: A compromise in the status, civil or otherwise, of Indian Muslims is justified
because they are presumably still benefiting from the misdeeds of their forebearers, as proven
by the fact of unequal distribution of goods across groups. Distributive justice therefore
requires that they give up this benefit and that it be redistributed to thosL-Indian Hinduswho have less than what they would have had absent the oppression in the past. It does not
matter, according to this redistributive argument, whether those who did the oppressing in the
past were themselves Muslims or anything else, only that their oppressions 'hufairly"
benefited some group in the present over some other. It does not even matter whether the
original oppressors in history have been the forebearers of the group that now benefits; all that
matters is, so to speak, "unjust enrichment." The argument is exquisitely zero-sum and so,
naturally, it adopts the language of tort. It is not, in fact, a "retributive" argument, as Sen
says, but merely "redistributive."
47. See generally Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and
Education (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993); Fundamentalisms and the State:
Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993);
Fundamentalisms Observed (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1991). For a convenient
summary review, see Fundamentalism Unlimited, The Economist, Mar. 27, 1993, at 45.
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mentalists as "ironists" about their pasts, but consciousness and selectivity imply distance, which is the essence of irony. It also leads to
ever greater fanaticism, because the "structural" irony, if acknowledged openly, would almost by definition mock God, who will not be
mocked; it must therefore be suppressed. But unlike post-modernism,
the fable, once elaborated, must be asserted as true, even if blood must
be spilled to defend it.
As Sen's own highly detailed, highly historical argument makes
clear, however, it is unavoidable to argue from the facts of each case.
Whether or not history is being distorted in the present is an empirical
question that must be answered on a case by case basis. This question, and the invented (or "contingent") nature of a particular ethnic
conflict cannot be presumed one way or the other. Some situations
may simply be tragedies of history. Perhaps there are cases where
peoples simply hate each other over centuries and kill each other a lot,
and their reasons for doing so are rooted in history. If that possibility
is ruled out a priori, the thesis is trivialized merely to mean that all
ethnic conflicts are modern and perhaps post-modern, invented and
contingent because those who engage in them are part of the modern
world-contemporary equaling modernity, and modern actors automatically signifying modern motivations. Those who assume that ethnic conflicts are contingent by assuming contingency make it rather
easy on themselves.
How well the "argument from invention" describes the Balkans is
very much open to debate. Sabrina Petra Ramet, writing recently
(and with an unconcealed Croatian tilt), accuses "Western officials
and publications" of circulating
myths that perpetuate misunderstanding about the nature of
the war ....Of those myths the most popular are these: the
conflict between Serbs and Croats is "centuries old" [and]
the war is primarily a "religious" war....
... Serbs

and Croats have, in fact, lived together peace-

fully for centuries prior to the twentieth century. There was
no rancor until after World War I, when the two nations
united in a single state. The Serbian regime ignored the protests of Croatian and Slovenian politicians ...

and intro-

duced a centralized government based in Belgrade [favoring
Serbs] ....It was this legacy of Serbian repression that gave
birth to the Yugoslav "national question." 8
48. Ramet, supra note 12, at 80-81.
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I suppose the "Western publications" she has in mind include The
Economist story quoted earlier.4 9 I also suppose that distinguished
historians far more expert than I, and likely of Serb extraction, will
dispute Professor Ramet's claims concerning "Serbian repression" in
exquisite detail. My point is only that in the Balkans there is, as I
said, so much of everything by way of explanation.
I argue below, but do not pretend it to be an exclusive explanation,
that the war in the former Yugoslavia has to do in part with the gradual breakdown of a system of pre-modern, non-universal balancing of
bureaucratized ethnic interest groups, a system of state-sponsored
"illiberal tolerance" based on pre-modern group, rather than on modem individual, identity. By reason of its tolerance, this system
(weirdly and disingenuously) succeeded in passing itself off as "liberal" and therefore "modern." The conflict is thus neither invented
nor contingent and is only partly modem. It is the historical consequence of pursuing a contradiction-the contradiction of the state
making its juridical object (the characteristic that defines individuals
in the eyes of the state) the pre-modem ethnic group, versus a claim of
communist modernity in which pre-modern group identity must inevitably disappear.
This explanation, which in any case is only partial, can share the
stage with other explanations, including the argument from invention,
but it is a long way from them. The argument from invention or contingency, however, is weakest when generated from a telos of immediate action and immediate accountability. The argument that ethnic
conflict is all modernistically or post-modernistically contingent is
irresistibly attractive to those seeking to find someone to hold
accountable for the conflict and seeking a course of action. Acknowledging that a conflict is rooted in pre-modern history, by contrast, is a
recipe for quietism. Witness the ignoble quiescence of the European
Community in the plain face of death camps, mass murder, deportation, extermination, rape, torture, ethnic cleansing and tens of
thousands threatened with starvation by siege in the midst of what is
ever more aptly called "Fortress Europe." 50 European governments
49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
50. Post-modernism is ambivalent on this point, however, as on so many others. Viewing a
conflict as contingent and invented, a narrative that can be re-imagined, may be a recipe for
action, even if the reason one is calling for action is that someone re-imagined the thread of
history in the first place and so invented the conflict. Its solution is equally contingent and
inventable and imaginable. The solution might also lead to quiescence, however. There is no
point in trying to "do anything" about something so fluidly re-inventable and re-imaginable.
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will surely deserve the campaign of terrorism that in future years is
likely to come of a displaced and embittered Muslim population.
Yet history cannot be called to account-no more by the Indian
Hindus that Sen attacks than by Western human rights organizations
seeking to indict co-conspirators in the rape of Bosnia. The human
rights movement has a powerful attraction to any form of explanation, empirically accurate or not, that yields someone, someone living,
to point at and call to account and which provides, whether in fact or
only in fantasy, contingencies that might have resulted in something
different.5 1
V.

FROM THE ARGUMENT FROM INVENTION TO LEGALISM

With respect to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, however, the
legalist exercise in accountability makes better sense. 52 It is possible
to point to the perpetrators of actual crimes and to those who planned
the actual crimes. One can try them for what they actually did.53 Let
them be tried from the top to the bottom, starting with Slobodan
Milosevic down to the individual commanders whose names Human
Rights Watch has been straining to gather by painstaking research in
the field.54 Although there is practical room to doubt that the Security Council's resolution establishing a war crimes tribunal for the war
in the former Yugoslavia was intended to be anything other than a
bargaining chip in the Vance-Owen or subsequent negotiations, to be
51. As Albert Camus said of Nuremberg:
When the English prosecuting attorney observes that "from Mein Kampf the road
led straight to the gas chambers at Maidenek," he touches on the real subject of the
trial, that of the historic responsibilities of Western nihilism and the only one which,
nevertheless, was not really discussed at Nuremberg, for reasons only too evident. A
trial cannot be conducted by announcing the general culpability of a civilization.
Only the actual deeds which, at least, stank in the nostrils of the entire world were
brought to judgment.
Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt 181 (Anthony Bower trans., New
York Vintage Books 1956). The rape of Bosnia proves, alas, that Europe has still not got past
that nihilism.
52. See Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, The Nation, Aug. 31, 1992, at 202, for the view of
the human rights movement regarding the creation of a war crimes tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.
53. See Bosnia: The War Criminals, The Economist, Feb. 20, 1993, at 46-47, for an
account of the events leading the Security Council to take "cautious steps.., towards a warcrimes tribunal" pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808. The Security Council, as of this
writing, has gone considerably further and actually established the tribunal at the Hague and
given it a statute. With the Vance-Owen peace plan apparently dead now, in June 1993, it is
hard to know what relevance these steps have, or even whether to view them an exercise in the
rule of law or merely the deepest cynicism.
54. See War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 9, vol. I, at 6-7, for an initial list of
senior commanders and political leaders that Human Rights Watch believes should face trial.
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given up in a swap of amnesty for the Serbs in exchange for land for
the Muslims, it would be desirable.55
The argument from invention is, however, peculiarly American,
both in its deployment in the legalist paradigm of action and accountability, and in its fundamental premise that there is always something
to be done. It shares the same roots as the profoundly American sensibility that there need be no true tragedies because all can be resolved
by assigning damages in tort. The argument from invention is legalist
insofar as it denies time, history and anything else that might stand in
the way of re-inventing the world using the fantastic contingencies
available through litigation.56 The rule of law is a mechanism, in the
American sensibility, less for imposing order on the world than reinventing it according to our desires. This sensibility, which in effect
55. Human Rights Watch, as of this writing, would like to take special envoy Cyrus Vance
at his word that he is committed to war crimes trials, as a non-negotiable issue separate from
any peace discussions. See id., vol. II, at 3 n.6. As David Rieff points out, however, there is
something so incongruous about the idea that the world negotiates with Serb leaders to reach a
peace settlement and then expects to put them on trial, even in theory, that it is simply a
"category mistake," in the sense of Gilbert Ryle. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind
(1949). The mistake in categories corresponds closely to Carl Schmitt's distinction between
"enemy" and "foe." See generally Special Issue: Carl Schmitt: Enemy or Foe, 72 Telos 3
(Summer 1987). At this writing, in June 1993, Vance-Owen is seemingly moribund and the
war in Bosnia is, strategically, virtually over in favor of the Serbs. The Croats scramble for
pieces of what remains of Bosnia while perhaps readying for renewed fighting with the Serbs
over Serb-controlled territory in Croatia. Outside powers ineffectually discuss "safe havens"
for Bosnian Muslims. See Bosnia: Battling On, The Economist, June 12, 1993, at 60.
56. It might be argued that the Security Council plan to establish a Yugoslav war crimes
tribunal is, in effect, even better than Nuremberg because, after all, Nuremberg was merely
victors' justice. But barring some act to force Serbia (and now the others as well) to give up
the accused-meaning some act that would make the Yugoslav tribunal victors' justice-it is,
in that inimitable American sense, merely imagined justice, which is to say no justice at all.
One tries in vain to imagine Churchill thinking for a moment that there could be justice at
Nuremberg without victory; there could be justice at Nuremberg only by Allied victory, and
the same, alas, is true of Yugoslavia. See generally Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, The
Nation, June 14, 1993, at 825.
More exactly, substantive justice, and not merely the symbolic justice of Nuremberg or any
tribunal, can come for the millions of people affected by ethnic cleansing only by massive,
outside intervention-war, in other words, and making sure that the just side wins. To
establish a symbolic tribunal-even if it did get its hands on the defendants, try them, and
punish them-without simultaneously taking the massive military action on the ground to
make good on the promise of real justice, the reversal of ethnic cleansing across the whole of
Bosnia, is a mockery and a hoax upon anyone silly enough to believe it. Nuremberg was a
lovely hood ornament on the ungainly vehicle that freed Europe from the Nazis; it was not,
however, a substitute for D-Day.
In any case, British and French diplomats have told me in recent months that they regard
all the tribunal talk as a way to distract and indulge the Americans, who, as one put it, "always
want to feel good about themselves, even if it requires kidding oneself into believing one is
doing something when in fact one is not." Or as a British colonel told me, "talk of a tribunal is
the tail wagging the dog of victory."
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denies the possibility of historical tragedy, even in the Balkans, lies at
the heart of the argument from invention. At bottom it is a claim that
there is always some way to fix things and always someone to blame.
It guards against the moral decadence of the quiescent Western
Europeans, for whom the very idea of justice is strange, but it is undefended against the American hubris of unconstrained desire masquerading as "justice"-which is, however, how every American impulse
ultimately masquerades. 57
VI.

EXPLANATIONS FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY

An altogether different kind of explanation for how the bitter and
hateful tribes managed to live in peace for so long can be found in the
categories of political economy. The political economy of Yugoslavia
was organized around two fundamental structures: Yugo-socialism
and Yugo-bureaucratism. Yugoslavia's famous "self-management"
system in effect unified the two and formed a system of economic and
bureaucratic gridlock that created and ratified failure in both
spheres. 8 This failure created a crisis of legitimacy in which, in the
absence of other institutions, ethnic chauvinism became dominant.
Yugo-socialism actually failed, however, in two quite separate
respects, one economic and the other political. First, Yugo-socialism
failed in its promise to deliver the goods of modernity: consumer
goods, and lots of them. No one minded that Yugo-socialism was not
delivering economically so long as foreign sovereign credit remained
good and guest worker remittances were strong. Indeed, there was
some congratulation and self-congratulation at Yugo-socialism having
apparently found a combination of socialism and private ownership,
the mythical third path, the holy grail of the Non-Aliged Movement. 59 Tito never collectivized the peasant small-holdings as Stalin
did, and never completely eliminated the petit bourgeoisie.
Tito also pressed forward Yugoslavia's peculiarly decentralized
engine of growth (and subsequent engine of economic crisis) that con57. With regard to this pathology of unconstrained American desire, see generally
Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (1991). The
sensibility that everything can always be fixed is authentically American not only because it is
a sensibility of unconstrained desire, but also because, for Americans, the world is always the
New World and nothing has any history. Accepting historical tragedy requires accepting
history, which hardly any American is prepared to do.
58. See generally Shoup, supra note 2; John R. Lampe et al., Yugoslav-American Economic
Relations since World War II (1990); Ljubo Sirc, The Yugoslav Economy under SelfManagement (1979).
59. See Lampe et al., supra note 58, chap. 4 and especially 74-79.
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stituted "worker self-management," and so earned a peculiar, implicit
reputation abroad as something of a non-communist and even perhaps a market realist. This contributed in turn to his reputation
(again implicit, and always by comparison to Stalin), strange as it may
seem, as a political liberal, a proto-liberal, a "fellow traveller" liberal
contending with "the tribes." This was to say, he was a proto-hiberal
because he was modern.1°
On the other hand, the large state-owned enterprises perpetually
lost money and became barely productive, non-competitive welfare
conduits for passing along, with transaction costs, credit from external state borrowing by the state banks.61 Yet those inclined to forever
smile on Yugoslavia as "something different" from the Warsaw Pact
economies could persist in thinking that in the matter of large,
money-losing state enterprises, Yugoslavia was no different from
Italy, much of Western Europe, or even other developing countries.
It was regarded as evidence of similarity rather than difference.'
When foreign credit eventually ran out, however, the true state of
the internal economy was revealed and things began to fall apart
politically. In the vacuum of legitimacy, bureaucratic nationalist politicians like Slobodan Milosevic arose phoenix-like from the ashes of
communism. It is a familiar story, a standard part of the economic
explanation of the rise of nationalism ever since Keynes' The Economic Consequences of the Peace.6 3 Being old, however, does not
make it less true. The story could be stretched to many volumes, but
the form is well-known.
VII.

PACIFICATION THROUGH "PASSIFICATION"

Second, and more important, Yugo-socialism failed as a political
system. It failed, more precisely, as a modernist political system.
Socialism as an economy failed to provide the items of consumption
60. This will scarcely be found in the scholarly literature, however, because anyone
interested enough in the facts of the Yugoslav political economy to write about it had to know
better. It was, rather, a loose perception on the part of foreign policy elites, a "spin" about
Yugoslavia and its strategic place in the world.
61. This claim was at the center of the so-called "Agrokomerc trial" of 1990, in which
senior members of a worker's self-managed enterprise were tried for floating funds in a way
that gave the enterprise free credit. Observing the trial in Bihac, Bosnia-Hercegovina in
1990-a then-dull market town today being destroyed by Serb heavy artillery-I was
astonished that the authorities would try someone for the way the banking system universally
functioned and was supposed to function. See generally Shoup, supra note 2, at 129. We now
understand that this was the standard fiscal arrangement across the communist world.
62. Lampe et al., supra note 58, at 75.
63. John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920).
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to satiate consumers who would otherwise become (and did become)
rabid nationalists. The socialist economy failed to secure ethnic social
peace through economic prosperity.64 The political purpose of a modem economy is to convert the maximum number of citizens possible
into happy, apolitical, exhausted consumers who have binged on consumer overchoice into torpor and dullness and passivity, like a child
left alone with a full box of chocolates. Yugo-socialism failed to
achieve this first purpose of a modem economy: pacification through
"passification. ' ' 65 In addition to this economic failure, Yugo-socialism also failed as a system of political hegemony.
Socialism and capitalism have one element in common as political
categories-they function as hegemons. They impose political order
and an ordering discipline on society by virtue of being the means of
production. By organizing production, each organizes society. Even
an advanced late-capitalist, post-modernist society is not organized
solely by niche marketing to ever more differentiated desires; it is also
organized by the means of production. In Yugoslavia's less-thanadvanced and scarcely capitalist economy, Lenin's discipline of the
factory was primary. When Yugo-socialism broke down as an economic system, it also broke down as a political hegemon. Into the
political vacuum flowed nationalism. It, at least, promised the
hegemony of a new ordering principle, the chief activity of which
today is ethnic cleansing.6 6
Far from denying the relevance of these explanations arising from
political economy, I want to affirm their importance. I wish, however, to focus upon another explanation-albeit one I will argue is
wrong or at least overstated. This explanation, which I term the
"fable of modernity progressing," can be deduced from an analysis of
modernity in politics. Too exclusive a focus on political economy
leaves this "fable of modernity progressing" neglected to one side,
even though it has been a standard explanation (though wrong in my
view) of how modernist institutions in Yugoslavia collapsed and gave
way to pre-modem tribalism carried out with modem weapons and
modem propaganda.
64. See Milan Nikolic, Yugoslavia's Failed Perestroika, 79 Telos 119 (1989).
65. Herbert Marcuse, of course, thought this was a bad thing. Remember, however, that he
wrote in a period of perennially rising standards of living. See Herbert Marcuse, One
Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1964). Those of us
sliding down the other side of the economic curve, and watching the rise of ethnic tensions
therefrom, might think, as I do, that what the restless tribes need is a healthy dose of
"passification" and "one-dimensionality."
66. For the theoretical underpinning of this view, see Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital:
A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (Tom Bottomore ed., 1981) (1910).
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The "fable of modernity progressing" is rarely stated as I state it
here, as a bald proposition, and it is even more rarely criticized, as I
do here. Instead it forms part of the substratum of assumptions about
why events in Yugoslavia proceeded as they did. It is an unexamined
assumption rather than an examined proposition about Yugoslav
political life. It is an assumption particularly evident though, by
implication, in the laments heard in some quarters (sometimes rueful,
sometimes not, but including even some anti-communist liberals) that
Tito, for all his faults and the faults of his communism, at least prevented the Yugoslav holocaust the world watches today.
This explanation runs as follows.
VIII.

THE FABLE OF MODERNITY PROGRESSING

Once upon a time, there were warring tribes whose passions had
sparked World War I and which, if unchecked following World War
II, threatened to spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation that
might result in World War M. Given the stakes, everyone worried
about Yugoslavia-NATO, the Warsaw Pact and, naturally, the
Yugoslavs. Interest in the ideology of the tribes arose, therefore, from
geopolitics. As a consequence, this instrumentalization of ideology
toward the ends of global grand strategy figures as a "taint" that
makes it impossible to "prove," in any strong sense, what was actually
"believed" by political actors and actually used as a basis for political
action versus simple cover for action based upon geopolitics. In the
case of NATO, geopolitics meant preservation of an independent
Yugoslavia, outside the orbit of Moscow, with whatever ideological
tools were at hand. Over time, it appears Moscow came to the same
view. In the case of Belgrade, geopolitics meant simply independent
survival.
It is therefore always possible, and moreover plausible, to read
Yugoslavia's ideological history, including such major initiatives as
midwifing the Non-Aligned Movement, as simply rhetoric atop geopolitical motivations. An extreme, but also plausible, view of the
break-up of Yugoslavia regards it as the inevitable geopolitical consequence of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the
Cold War.67
From the outset in offering this little modernist fable, therefore, I
67. See generally the extremely lucid Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (1979) (with
respect to all of my comments concerning Tito). For a historically acute account of external
security issues, see Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Paul
Shoup ed., 1990).
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do not want to deny that it can be viewed as merely a red herring by
comparison with the real business of geopolitics. My aims are far
more modest: Insofar as anyone took ideological argument to have
independent weight with respect to the Yugoslav situation, then a
background ideological assumption legitimating Titoism and the
"Yugoslav model" was the assumption of "modernity progressing"
offered below.
There were other background assumptions, however, some running
absolutely counter to this one, and it is always possible to discount the
ideological background altogether. Moreover, "proof" or even good
evidence of something that is fundamentally attitudinal and easily
masked by other phenomena is hard to come by. What I offer is
hopelessly anecdotal. Nevertheless, my experience in Yugoslavia suggests that those familiar with its post-war history and the debates
among the intellectuals and foreign policy elites will intuitively recognize the essentials of the fable, even if they dispute what role it actually played in the legitimation of the road to Yugoslavia's current hell.
Against that disclaimer, now the fable.
Fighting the Nazis had taught Tito and his communist followers
two things. First, the warring tribes were each too small to survive
alone in the world against such predators as the German Nazis, the
Red Army, and NATO. Second, the warring tribes would continue to
fight and tear each other apart internally, making them all more vulnerable to outsiders, unless they were yoked together under a common political authority and an ideology to give it legitimacy beyond
the bare demands of tribal survival. That political authority would be
federal Yugoslavia. Its ideology would be the most modern, yoking,
hegemonistic ideology available-viz., communism. Its modus operandi would also be the most modem possible, bureaucratic socialism.
Post-war Yugoslavia would thus be very, very modern, and one of
the ideas central to modernity is progress. The Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Hungarians, Montenegrins, and Albanians would gradually
"progress" toward a modern future in which identity would also be
defined modernistically. Each would lose its old nationalist identity
in favor of the identity of the Yugoslav "New Socialist Man."
Ancient, pre-modern tribal identities would recede to a nostalgic past.
More significantly and ominously, the internal borders between the
former nations, whatever they had been and however they had been
drawn, would become mere bureaucratic subdivisions in a modern
nation-state progressing toward universality.68
68. Much the same, interestingly, as the way proponents of mass busing in the U.S. argued
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The fable of modernity progressing always had, to be sure, glaring
countervailing tendencies. It is quite possible to attack the fable in the
way I suggested above, as a red herring and explanatory fifth wheel,
or else as insusceptible of proof. It does not really succeed to attack
the fable, however, by pointing out its countervailing, anti-modemist
tendencies, because these tendencies were openly acknowledged, at
least among the intellectual and ideological elites. Titoism, for example, like Stalinism, depended on the cult of the leader. It strove
toward modernist bureaucratic socialism, and yet the top post, the
legitimizing principle of the whole system, was not a bureaucrat or
even a socialist, but instead what Solzynitzyn said of Stalin, an
"egocrat." 69
Nothing could be less modem than a charismatic leader made into
a cult, and yet there was Tito. It could be justified in Yugoslavia (and
crucially distinguished from Stalinism for those committed to showing the Yugoslav "difference") as a necessary, if intellectually embarrassing, measure by which to defend against tribalism. In effect, it
was modernists adopting a pre-modem defense against pre-modemism. Still, does anyone want to recall who wrote that moving tribute
to the Leader's omniscience, "Tito and the Art of Rose Gardening?" 70
It is also true that most totalizing movements in modem history
have depended on the cult of the charismatic leader, from Hitler to
Pol Pot to Abimael Guzman. The tendency remains in each case an
anachronism contrary to the universality that characterizes modernity. In this case, modernist "universality" means the interchangeability and utter replaceability of each individual person. 7'
Universality renders charisma irrelevant. This is also how universalto the courts that school district lines were merely bureaucratic subdivisions of the state and
that there could be no legitimate questions of local community. Of course, in Yugoslavia this
could never be. The shifling of borders was always done, as pointed out in the subsequent
critique of this fable, for purposes of balancing and containing varieties of nationalist
sentiment. The tragedy-prefiguring the critique I offier below-is that this was offered as an
exercise in modem bureaucracy, an exercise in modernist politics, whereas in fact it was an
exercise in pre-modem ethnic balancing. The contradiction eventually proved untenable, and
hence the war to shift things "back," whatever that might mean.
69. See generally Bernard-Henri Levy, Barbarism with a Human Face (1979).
70. A Yugoslav lawyer once showed me this book from his personal shelves. He said it had
not been a bestseller. The only reason "Tito" appeared in the title, he told me, was that it was
a ploy to have book printing paper stock allocated to a "Tito" title.
71. The clearest statement of this is found not in philosophy or social theory, but in Bertolt
Brecht, "A Man's a Man," in 2 Bertolt Brecht- Collected Plays (Ralph Manheim & John
Willett eds., 1977). An Eric Bentley adaptation of the play in English supplies the following
addition:
A man's a man is Mister Brecht's contention. But that is something anyone might
mention. Mr. Brecht appends this item to the bill: You can do with a human being
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ism finally becomes synonymous with totalitarianism, bureaucratism
and utterly fluid capitalism72 in the completion of the project of
73
modernity.
IX.

THE FABLE'S Two PROPOSITIONS

The fable of post-war Yugoslavia was always careful to acknowledge these contradictory tendencies. Nonetheless, it implies the following descriptive proposition, notwithstanding such anti-modern
tendencies as leader worship. The political aim of Titoism, of Yugoslav bureaucratic socialism, of the very concept of federal Yugoslavia,
was to eliminate ethnicity and nationalism from being the constitutive
elements in the identity of Yugoslav citizens. Over time, they would
"progress" to become, in their relations with the state, and in the
state's relations with them, merely Yugoslav citizens.
This essentially descriptive proposition is also accompanied by a
normative proposition, viz., that this progress toward universality
constituted desirable modern progress, and was even compatible with,
or perhaps a precursor to, modernist liberalism. Despite the depredations committed against actual individuals by the communists-i.e.,
the one-party state assault on free expression and association, the rubout of civil society, the police state, the internal security forces and
the show trials-at least these actions aimed at breaking down old
ethnic group identities in favor of universalist individualism. Individual liberties could not survive in Yugoslavia until the old ethnic divisions had been destroyed. Otherwise, individual liberty as exercised
by ethnicists would undermine individualism and, with it, individual
liberty in favor of ethnic chauvinism.
It was a rough, mean method of reaching a point in which individualism would prevail, but it could be seen as compatible with liberalism
because at least it put individualism ahead of ethnicity. It sought to
what you will. Take him apart like a car, rebuild him bit by bit- As you will see, he
has nothing to lose by it....

Bertolt Brecht, "A Man's a Man," in Baal, A Man's A Man and The Elephant Calf: Early
Plays by Bertolt Brecht 160 (Eric Bentley ed., 1983).
72. Levy, supra note 69, at 97. Levy, however, notes that capital "is the first mode of
production that . . . [is] . . . constantly fantasizing about itself in terms of perpetual

incompletion." Id. Thus, for Levy, it is unclear what the "completion of the project of
modernity" would mean for capital, or even that it could come about.
73. See, e.g., Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (1989). See especially his
discussion of the Holocaust as the very test of modernity. Id. at 6. See also Levy, supra note
69, at 158 ("Can't we see . .. clearly what [the modernist] has been fantasizing for two
centuries but has not dared to push to its limits-the state of Universality and the society of
Uniformity?").
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eliminate the tribe as the legitimate identity mediating between individual and state. Surely this had to be a step closer to liberalism. To
put it another way, any step toward modernity from pre-modernity
automatically, programmatically,objectively (as the Marxists might
say) had to be supported as a necessary foundation for liberalism,
which is, in the first place, modern.
X. TRACES THE MODERNIST FABLE LEFr BEHIND
As noted, the fable consists of a descriptive and a normative proposition. The descriptive proposition says that post-war Yugoslavia
embodied policies aimed at eliminating ethnicity as the basis of staterecognized identity, in favor of universal individualism, and in effect
creating the modern out of the pre-modern. This, in fact, understates
dramatically what anyone actually thought. Anyone looking even
cursorily at Yugoslavia had to see more complexity than that, but I
put it here ruthlessly simplified in order to capture a certain ideological tendency.
The normative proposition says that despite the excesses and
attacks on the liberties of those deviant individuals intent on recovering ethnicity as the basis of the state, the modernist goal behind these
policies was nonetheless desirable. The elimination of ethnic irredentism was always a necessary pre-condition to individualism and liberalism, even if it was acknowledged that the aim of Titoism was
scarcely individualism or liberalism. Any form of modernity must be
better than pre-modern civil war, which is what the whispered
laments and longings for Tito, Tito-nostalgia, amount to today.
If, of course, the descriptive proposition understates the factual
complexities, then the normative proposition surely overstates how
much the attack on ethnic irredentism represented carefully considered political theory. Jailing, beating, torturing, and killing irredentists were merely what they looked like-exercises in ordinary state
security, and only by implication exercises in modernity.
I intend to challenge both of the fable's propositions, however,
beginning with the second, the normative. In so doing, let me reiterate that the propositions have been deliberately exaggerated in order
to isolate and abstract the ideological assumptions underlying the factual complications. Likewise, I do not think this fable is susceptible of
"strong" proof. At a minimum it is consistent with, and functioned
as an intellectual bulwark for, the omnipresent belief that without an
authoritarian but modernist government in Yugoslavia, the result
would quickly be civil war.
Consistency is not proof, however, at least not in any strong sense.
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Thus, while the fact of war today in former Yugoslavia is consistent
with the fable, it is also consistent with other, equally plausible beliefs.
Proof is not my aim here. My aim is rather to identify a tendency that
resonates in my and others' experiences.
Since that which may establish resonance for these two propositions is at least partly anecdotal, the experience of human rights
monitors reporting on Yugoslavia is instructive. Consider the socalled "Belgrade Eight" during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Belgrade Eight, a group of academic philosophers and sociologists and
founders of the influential Marxist social theory journal Praxis, were
removed from their teaching posts at Belgrade University in the early
1970s for ideological deviancy. Yet far from being sent to the gulag,
they were instead, as Sharon Zukin put it in 1978, given the "universal academic dream. They are free to travel and to lecture outside the
country; they enjoy tenured status at full salary; and they have no
teaching duties." On the other hand, they "are not permitted to lecture or to hold meetings in Yugoslavia; they are only slowly reappearing in print in Yugoslav journals and books; they believe that their
mail is inspected; and they are prohibited from teaching."'74
Zukin notes that the "'balance' of prohibitions and perquisites is
not the product of either full constitutional legality or totalitarian terror--each of which would have produced an unambiguous punishment or vindication. ' 75 The treatment of the Belgrade Eight was
instead a function of the fact that, despite their unorthodox Marxism,
they were nonetheless Marxist humanists, modernists and universalists in the glorious sense, men and women of progress and progressivism. They were not nationalists or irredentists. 6
Their treatment can be sharply contrasted with that of those associated with the so-called "Croatian Spring" of roughly the same
period.77 The Croatian Spring was also a humanist movement and, in
its emphasis on individual freedom of expression in letters and the
arts, a liberal movement in a certain sense. It was also closely tied to
Croatian national identity, however, which formed, at least in the eyes
of federal Yugoslavia, the true and radically pre-modern object of all
that supposedly "individualist" free expression. In the eyes of Westem human rights observers, Croatian Spring was driven by individuals who happened to choose to express their Croatian identities. In
74. Sharon Zukin, Introduction to the "Belgrade Manifesto," 35 Telos 184 (1978).
75. Id.
76. At least they were not in the 1970s; several of the Belgrade Eight have become closely
associated with radical Serb nationalism.
77. For a concise description, see Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans 72-73 (1991).
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the eyes of the regime, it was driven by Croatian nationalism falsely
putting on the mask of individualism. Many of those associated with
Croatian Spring went to jail, some for very long periods of time.7 8
The point of the comparison is that those who believed, more or
less, in the fable of "modernity progressing" were treated, even in
their deviancy, far differently from those who had some altogether
different idea. Could the differences be explained other ways, without
specific recourse to the two propositions of the modernist fable?
Surely. The comparison does not prove the fable. There is little
doubt, though, that it was both a serious handicap to be someone who
embedded humanism in any form of nationalism, as in the Croatian
Spring, and a positive aid to be someone who embedded it in universal
progressivism, as in Praxis circles.79 More precisely, Titoism denied
that it was possible to be a "humanist" and a "nationalist." The current war is also sourly urging the same point: nationalists are not
humanists; in the former Yugoslavia they are murderers.
During the late 1980s, the U.S.-based human rights monitor
Human Rights Watch found it difficult to convince very many in the
Western capitals and embassies that Yugoslavia was a repressive
place.8 0 They knew it was, at least if one was an ethnic Albanian, but
frankly, in my own experience trying to convey this message on behalf
of Human Rights Watch, there was a feeling that repression was the
only way to deal with irredentism. The sense was that it was unfortunate, but that the nationalist extremists more or less brought it on
themselves. I am distilling and condensing, to my own ends in this
essay, a great many conversations with diplomats and journalists and
international affairs experts, which is unfair as a scholarly device
because the conversations cannot be checked. I believe, however, that
many who took part in such discussions would immediately acknowledge this as the prevailing zeitgeist. The United States embassy in
Belgrade under Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was a notable and
practically singular exception to this trend.
Of course, everyone would dutifully sign on to protest torture
against some particular ethnic Albanian Kosovan, but there was an
unstated subtext that harsh measures were required against fanatics.
One simply hoped the measures did not become so incorrect as to
78. Shoup, supra note 2, at 139 n.30.
79. Id. at 139-40.
80. See, e.g., Helsinki Watch (division of Human Rights Watch), Increasing Turbulence:
Human Rights in Yugoslavia (1989); Helsinki Watch (division of Human Rights Watch),
Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo (1990); Human Rights Watch, World Report 1990 at 417-423
(1991).
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violate the Torture Convention."1 In particular, most really did not
want to know, again with the admirable exception of Ambassador
Zimmerman and his staff.
How does one show something so attitudinal? I do not know how
else to interpret the raised eyebrow in a chancellery when Human
Rights Watch would inform the startled political officer that Yugoslavia was holding thousands of political prisoners. Upon adding that
ninety percent were Albanian teenagers, and not Sakharov or Praxis
philosophers, however, the eyebrow would go down again. I recall,
among other instances, being told by a British diplomat of the same
period that only by smashing the nationalists of all ethnicities could
Yugoslavia avoid a civil war that would self-evidently prejudice the
human rights of all individuals in Yugoslavia. 2
I also recall the editor of a respected political science book series in
the United Kingdom questioning an article on human rights in Yugoslavia, saying that surely Yugoslavia was the most "liberal" of the
communist countries. What he meant, in fact, was that Yugoslavia
allowed more private property, or greater economic liberalism. Yugoslavia also allowed greater freedom to travel and work abroad, which
by the 1980s was an absolute economic necessity, and more independence from Moscow. Perhaps the editor also meant that Yugoslavia
was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was also true, as he
pointed out, that Yugoslavia's rulers allowed more open discussion on
anything but nationalism than other communist countries. It understood that its real enemies were not deviant Marxist humanists. What
was striking in this editor's attitude, however, and more generally in
attitudes across the West, was the presumption that of course the
regime had to repress the nationalists and, more strikingly, that this
did not prejudice its supposed, if qualified, "liberalism."
It is true enough, as the British diplomat predicted in 1989, that the
human rights of all individuals have been prejudiced by the war in the
former Yugoslavia. But calling to smash individual nationalists for
the sake of individualist human rights, as he characterized it, is a
rationale firmly in the spirit of the fable offered above. The repression
of nationalism serves the ends of modernity and, by implication,
serves to establish the possibility of liberalism.

81. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), entered
into force June 26, 1987.
82. This conversation took place in Belgrade in 1989.
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XI.

MODERNITY AND LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM

Smashing pre-modem group identities to allow individuals to be
reconstituted in the image of modem individualism (which is a necessary precursor to liberalism) is an important political program in
more places than just Yugoslavia and its sad progeny. I have
deployed this normative proposition with reference to post-war Yugoslavia as, in effect, a liberal individualist's defense of modernist communism-on the ground that at least communism is modem. The
same general proposition, however, figures in virtually any debate
over the authoritarian defense of the human rights of individuals as
against pre-modem group identity and norms. Some form of the
proposition figures into every debate over modernity-anywhere the
past threatens upon the present. The proposition is also evident in the
grand debate between fundamentalist Islam and the West and, still
more precisely, between fundamentalist Islam and feminism.
Consider contemporary Algeria, for example.8 3 The last general
election in Algeria was clearly won by Islamic fundamentalists, who
promised in more or less short order to roll back modernity, abolish
(but supposedly by democratic means) secular democracy, impose
Islamic shari'a law, put women into veils and prohibit them from
public life and create another Islamic republic. The army, the sine
qua non of modernist authoritarianism the whole world over, intervened in this exercise of democracy and arrested the leading Islamists,
to the great relief of Algerian liberals and secularists,8 the scarcely
concealed relief of Western human rights activists 5 and the overt joy
of feminists.86 Behind the various rationales offered by human rights
83. The best short account I have seen is Terence Wrong, Mullah's Day: Algeria Braces for
the Worst, The New Republic, Feb. 17, 1992, at 18. See also Algeria: Old Record, Scratchy
Needle, The Economist, Apr. 3, 1993, at 42 ("[TIhe army... sees itself as protector of the
state and last bastion against an Islamic takeover.").
84. Wrong, supra note 83, at 19.
Hafedi Sherifi is married to a lawyer and has a 9-year-old son. Several of her son's
schoolteachers have become fundamentalists.... Recently her son came home from
school and told her that since she was a woman she must eat dinner in the kitchen by

herself. And he would not be kissing her goodnight anymore. "I could take them
spitting at me in the street and shouting at me to 'cover up', but this I cannot take,"
she says ....
Democracy is a lovely idea," she says, "but in the end we couldn't
afford it."
Id.
85. Human rights organizations might of course deny it, but let us not fool ourselves. See
Middle East Watch (division of Human Rights Watch), Human Rights in Algeria Since the
Halt of the Electoral Process, Feb. 1992 [hereinafter Human Rights in Algeria], for an
extraordinarily (and justifiably) anxious analysis of the liberal principles sought to be applied
in this case.
86. Wrong, supra note 83, at 19.
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monitors concerning the circumstances under which constitutions
and "fundamental" political conditions of society could be altered
lurks the essential conviction that human rights, or liberal individualism, is fundamentally a function of modernity, and that modernity
must be preserved above all. 7 Better modernity than democracy.
Algeria represents modernist authoritarianism imposed (as Western
feminists saw it, for example) directly in favor of individual liberty
and against pre-modern authoritarianism. The case is complicated by
the fact that the Islamists took aim at secular democracy-the
claimed genesis of their legal legitimacy-as well as at secular women.
It is nevertheless not hard to see a day when the human rights community in the United States will see the Algerian army as equivalent
to the United States sending troops to Little Rock.
It is the proliferation of situations like that of Algeria, the pre-modern desires of the mass colliding with the sensibilities of elites, that
accounts for the profound distrust of the human rights movement for
democracy and the movement's preference to be the guardian of the
general will, human rights, over the popular will, mere democracy. It
is also another part of the marked preference of the human rights
movement to "explain" (as discussed earlier with regard to the "argument from invention") anti-progressive and anti-modern democratic
choices by delegitimating their democratic character and instead
ascribing them to the manipulations of grasping politicians. The politicians, by implication, are not legitimate and their actions need not
be respected.
Thus the purity, or at least the innocence, in Rousseau's sense, of
the "people" is preserved. So is their implied approval of what the
elitist human rights movement, in interpreting the general will on
their behalf, says they would have approved but for illegitimate rulers
Nadia Kheddar, a university instructor, is hoping the army, having dispensed with
the elections, will finish off the fundamentalists. "I was having nightmares. I didn't
put on perfume for a week. I wore my worst slacks. I was in a state of controlled
terror. It's not just wearing the chador that scared me. It would be the end of my
life, my work. I couldn't speak to men. It would be the end of freedom."
Id.
87. See Human Rights in Algeria, supra note 85, at 16, for a statement of principles for
when Human Rights Watch thinks democracy can be suspended in favor of "fundamental
rights of citizens." To be sure, this statement concludes that under the facts so far, the
suspension of the Algerian electoral process is worse, in human rights terms, than the
Islamists' threat to fundamental rights. Nonetheless, the principles themselves make clear that
the human rights movement by no means sees human rights as bound by the results of
elections. This is, of course, the traditional anti-populism of civil libertarians, and, in historical
U.S. terms, it has the curious result of aligning elite civil libertarians with the Federalists
against the masses. It is a page civil libertarians have taken out of the Federalist Papers.
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and politicians.88
Titoism was inherently more ambiguous than Algeria's Islamic fun-

damentalism or Islam anywhere. Unlike Islam, of course, Tito's communism was always unabashedly modem. Still, Tito's communism
did not aim, in theory or in fact, toward the ends of liberal individualism as a historical project, albeit one to be carried through, however
paradoxically, by modernist authoritarianism. Communism always
said that it led not to individualism but to, well, communism. The
fable of modernity progressing assumes that the end of modernist
universality is the hegemony of individualism: communist ideology,

however, never saw it that way. Universality for communism, in the
end, was an identity consisting of neither individualism nor pre-modem tribalism, but instead identification with the universal collective,
the commune, the whole, the totality.89

Modernity's ideal of universality can thus be fulfilled in either of
two opposite directions: the hegemony of individuals or the hegemony of the all-inclusive group. Either one is "modem"; each precludes pre-modem tribalism.
The oppressiveness of the former, individualism, is by reason of the
atomized unconnectedness of each individual existing alone. The
88. The increasingly voguish concept of "civil society" is another ill-defined rhetoric by
which the Western human rights movement puts its words into the mouths of others elsewhere
and claims legitimacy and universality for its interventions. See generally Jean Cohen &
Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (1992); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of
Civil Society (1992); Andrew Arato, Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980-81, 47 Telos
23 (Spring 1981); Andrew Arato, Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981-82, 50 Telos 19
(Winter 1981-82).
No doubt there is still civil society in some places, and no doubt it is
important. Unfortunately, civil society is strongest where it is made up, not of those voluntary
associations that liberals love to love, such as the PTA, the chess club, and the American Civil
Liberties Union, but the elements of constitutive pre-modern identity, Le., family, village,
religion, ethnicity, and tribe. True, there are pre-modern societies cherished by the forces of
progress-the "cute" cultures of the Amazon rainforest or the Mayan Indians. They are
cherished, however, for the same reason we love fierce animals in zoos: they pose no threat to
us. When they do-as with Islam-then they are suddenly no longer counted as part of "civil
society," but instead as a betrayal of it. And so they are a threat-not to civil society as such,
but to modernist institutions and to the voluntary, non-constitutive associations that alone are
able to conform to modern modes of production. See Kenneth Anderson et al., Roundtable on
Communitarianism, 76 Telos 2 (1988).
89. Fools consider it a book for high-schoolers, but there is no better work on this than
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (2d ed. 1982). Now that communism has dissolved,
there has been a revisionist tendency to say that it never aimed at totality-that it was never
anything more than a brutal dictatorship, authoritarian, but not totalitarian, and that nothing
ever was or could be "totalitarian" in any strong sense, the sense used in the discussion above.
See, e.g., Moishe Gonzales, Exorcising Perestroika,reviewing Gorbachev: The Debate (Ferenc
Fehr & Andrew Arato eds., 1989), 81 Telos 130 (1989). Gonzales, however, misses the point.
The fact that a social system aims at totality, but only gets 70 or 80 percent of the way to
Nineteen Eighty-Fourseems to me to be quite far enough along toward totalitarianism.
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pathology of individual atomization has been endlessly documented;
Marx was only the most prominent of its etiologists.90
The oppressiveness of the latter, however, group hegemony, begins
with the fact that the group excludes no one. The statement "no one
is allowed to be excluded" has two meanings. The first is that the
group can exclude no one; the second is that no one is permitted to

remain outside the group. Each of these meanings of group identity
as forms of universality, however, creates an essentially modernist,
totalizing group identity. Moreover, there can be no other meaning
for group identity under an ideology of universality, which is why the
social philosophy of "inclusion," that current article of faith of the
American liberal-left (believing itself to be soft and kind and gentle
and sharing and caring), is merely the beginning of oppression. 9t
90. See Zygmunt Bauman, Strangers: The Social Construction of Universality and
Particularity, 78 Telos 7 (1988-89). When the cure for atomization is "connectedness" made
by the state, rather than by the "organic," "constitutive" communities of civil society, then the
result is the now-popular "politics of meaning." See infra note 99. The scheme, popular with
nationalists and politicians who stand to gain by the expansion of the state, is untenable.
"Connectedness" is a function of "constitutive" communities, which are always particular.
The state, by contrast, if it proposes to be "modem" and "liberal," must always be universal.
Both the "politics of meaning" and "multiculturalism" want it to be both simultaneously.
91. More precisely, the American liberal-left has lost interest in the formerly liberal ideal of
tolerance. Tolerance in liberal thought meant, once upon a time, that irrespective of what a
person believed, whether on religious or other grounds, others not so believing and not so
acting would not be attacked and driven from the public sphere.
American left-liberals now do not trust that there can be a separation of personal belief and
public action, although it was formerly the essence of toleration. Persons can be trusted to
behave in the public sphere only insofar as they personally believe. This is not tolerance,
however; it is instead the belief that social peace can be maintained in the public sphere only if
everyone personally believes the same thing. It is the polar opposite of tolerance. Moreover, it
aims at totality and, uncomfortable as this may be for American left-liberals who support the
human rights movement, it is directly an attack on civil society.
And it is also the Rainbow Curriculum in New York City schools. The premise underlying
that pedagogy is that respect for people in the public sphere-respectful behavior-requires
assimilation of private thought into the norm of the state and, in particular, that one not be
Catholic in any sense other than Anna Quindlen's. I am at a loss to see any difference between
the Rainbow Curriculum and the Islamist teachings Hafedi Sherifi's nine-year-old son brought
home with him from his Algerian grammar school. See supra note 84. Unsurprisingly, this is
also the premise of the argument to drive gays from the U.S. military, viz, it is inconceivable
that behavior in the public sphere might differ from private desires. Also unsurprisingly, it is
the premise of the anti-abortion movement. All are interested in a confessional state, a
confessional public sphere, in which the point of the public sphere is a place for confessing
private allegiance to the totalizing ideology of the public, and in which confession is inevitably
made in the federal courts.
The refusal to accept a separation between private belief and public action is part of a more
general trend in American thought, the refusal to see any difference between wish and action.
It is a more and more prominent feature of American feminism, drawn (ironically) from
Freudianism and Catholicism, both of which emphasize the identity of wish and act, and both
of which are thoroughly illiberal. It is also the most profound method of attack yet on the
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REFUSING TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT OF MODERNITY

Modernity and liberal individualism are not of course synonymous.
It is equally not the case, however, that liberal individualism is the
completion, the last stage, of the project of modernity-totality is.
Liberal individualism rather more likely represents a refusal to complete the project of universality, or a refusal to complete modernity.
Closely associated with Camus' call for resistance and a philosophy
of rebellion, this other project of modernity might be called the "project of modernist modesty," or more simply, anti-hubris.92 If individuals are largely constituted by their ties to social groups, and
principally by their ties to the irreplaceable social groups of premodernity-family, village, religion, and tribe-then the project of
modernity, by wiping out the cohesion of these groups, wipes out individual identity as well. 93 What's left is only an identity (to the extent
identity is even possible) with the single, overarching, all-inclusive
whole. In old-fashioned communist ideology, that all-inclusive total94
ity was the Party.

The Party, of course, is no longer a popular version of the project of
modernity. The project lives on, however, masked by new forces of
capital which now stress sector marketing, niche marketing, narrowcasting, and differentiation of product lines that appeal to particular
categories of consumers rather than using the power of the market
and media to bring about homogenization-the means, in other
words, of post-modernism, even if not the ends, which claims to be
ironic, distant, and non-totalizing. Other trends, equally deracinating
of individuals, mask the forces of totality. The current demand for
totality in American social life, for example, calls itself "diversity."
Unsurprisingly it is closely associated with the American left-liberal
call for "inclusion." The coercive nature of the American diversity
division between the public and the private-far more profound than the word games played,
for example, by Critical Legal Studies lawyers. In effect, the state must be permitted to reach
into the private in order to purify the public, to measure, alter and conform private desire
because that is the only "sure" means of controlling public behavior.
With the erasure of the distinction between wish and act goes civil society, which depends,
of course, on the existence of the private. Luckily for the concept of the private, however, the

American Civil Liberties Union has suddenly (after years of seeking to erode it) rediscovered
the instrumental uses of the private-albeit solely to the end of protecting abortion clinics.
92. See generally the new and very useful study, Jeffrey C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and

Modem Rebellion (1992).
93. See generally Anderson et al., supra note 88, at 2.
94. As Orwell stressed in Nineteen Eighty-Four, however, this identity is simultaneously
total, leaving room for nothing else, and thin, meaning that the individual lacking room for
anything else is spiritually empty. Totality and "thinness" are two sides of the same coin. See
infra note 100 on "thin people."

422

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:385

movement, however, and its status as a quasi-theological enterprise of
the state (its aim being to de-center and destabilize what remains of
civil society) make it precisely the institution that no one is allowed to
remain outside.
Diversity is thus ideological cover for forced inclusiveness, and is at
once totalizing and oppressive. And, in effect, the completion of
modernity is necessarily totalitarianism. This is hardly new or
remarkable; it is part simplification and part bastardization of
Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.95
This is not to say that the liberal individualist committed to defending such modernist authoritarianism as Tito's has no reply. It is
always possible to assert that in fact the completion of modernity
never happens because it always derails into liberal individualism.
Totality is never actually reached, and what remains is precisely the
condition sought, viz., incomplete modernity and, as a consequence,
liberal individualism. One wonders if Francis Fukuyama might not
have done better with this argument than the Hegelian argument he
tried popularly but unsuccessfully to make, viz., that liberal individualism is the completion of modernity.96 This derailment into liberal
individualism, if true, would be a fortunate happen-stance, but who
would want to take the risk to find out? In any case, this form of
reply is far from uncritically accepting any form of modernity as
desirable merely on the assumption that modernity is a necessary precursor to liberal individualism.
There are thus more possibilities in modernity than simply liberalism and individualism. Totalitarianism is another, and the more
likely, whatever its guises, if the aim is to complete modernity. Titoism, in its public persona at least, formally aimed at completing
modernity. But accepting authoritarianism as a supposed means to
the end of liberal individualism is not only distasteful on its own
account; it is also not evident that liberal individualism is likely to be
the result, in theory or in fact. It is far more satisfying simply to own
up that one accepts modernist authoritarianism, if one does, where
the alternative is Yugo-war or the tender regard of the Islamic Republic for women, as a bulwark against the oppression of the pre-modern,
but not anticipating any turn thereby to liberal individualism.97
95. Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972).
96. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). One of the oddest
things in the post-cold war ideological confusion is the deployment of Hegelianism by centerconsumerist-liberals like Fukuyama. For a sharp rejoinder to Fukuyama, see Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century (1993).
97. The easy way out-entirely too easy-is to say that the conundrum of needing
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XIH.

THE PROJECT OF MODESTY, OR, ANTI-HUBRIS

The preceding section aims to caution partisans of liberal individualism against expecting very much from modernity, especially in its
authoritarian forms or in forms aiming at totality, solely on account
of modernity being modem. It also cautions against the drive to complete the project of modernity, but without endorsing the project of
post-modernity.98 Instead, I want to endorse a new project within the
scope of modernity, a uniquely liberalhistorical project, the project of
modesty and anti-hubris.
The project of modesty and anti-hubris is constituted by the refusal
to complete the project of modernity because it leads to totality, on
one hand, but without retreating from meaning in the manner of the
post-modernists (who float far above in the jetstream, offering ironic
comments on the "text" and the "narrative," and damn little else) on
the other. In the face of the sieges in Bosnia, the starvation in
Somalia and the genocide in Kurdistan, anyone worth talking to has
long since beat a retreat back to "meaning"-"meaning," that is, and
not the "politics of meaning"-and reengaged with at least a provisional and incomplete and modest morality. There is hard work to be
done on the planet earth, yet without the pretense that any project of
history or politics will save the world. The project of modesty and
anti-hubris admits no angels to its ranks and has nothing to do with
redemption.99 It aims merely to secure what used to be known as
modernist authoritarianism to repress "fundamentalism" or pre-modern movements is the
result of having repressed them and deprived them of human rights and democracy in the first
place. If they had had human rights and democracy all along, then they would have turned
out to be, well, "people like us." Only the human rights movement could have so little regard
for history as to believe this. But why worry about history when one has the categorical
imperative on, so to speak, open account?
98. Some post-modernists might laugh at seeing post-modernism described as a "project""how... how modernist"-but that's of little moment.
99. The theoretical-as distinguished from purely political-debate over the so-called
"politics of redemption" was most acute during the last fifteen years in Telos. See, eg., Paul
Breines, Redeeming Redemption, 65 Telos 152 (Fall 1985); Ferenc Feher, Redemptive and
Democratic Paradigms in Radical Politics, 63 Telos 147 (Spring 1985); Moishe Gonzales,
Theoretical Amnesia, 65 Telos 163 (Fall 1985); Joel Whitebook, The Politics of Redemption,
63 Telos 156 (Spring 1985); Richard Wolin, Against Adjustment, 65 Telos 158 (Fall 1985).
The current incarnation of the politics of redemption within American left-liberalism is
Michael Lerner's "politics of meaning"-a rhetorical device eagerly picked up by the Clinton
campaign in 1992 from Tikkun magazine. See generally Tikkun, May-June 1993, at 7;
Thomas Fields-Meyer, This Year's Prophet, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1993, § 6 (magazine), at 28
('With Tikkun, his magazine of the Jewish left, and his catch phrase 'politics of meaning,'
Michael Lerner has become the Clintons' Norman Podhoretz."). More recently, the Clinton
administration has found the "politics of meaning" a convenient refuge from more tangible
managerial-political tasks like reforming health care; see Tomorrow never comes, The
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political liberalism: the conditions under which each can work out his
or her salvation in fear and trembling before any deity except politics,
and understanding that, with respect to politics, "a limit, under the
sun, shall curb them all."' ' °
XIV.

YUGOSLAV LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

This essay has not strayed so far from the problem of the fall of
Yugoslavia as it might appear. There have been many efforts to justify modernist authoritarianism, and Yugoslavia and the former
Yugoslavia are rich historical examples of how and why the justification might be undertaken. It is a mistake to ignore the connections
between these efforts and the vastly larger fabric of social theory. The
problem of Yugoslavia is important in its own right, but it is also
emblematic of a more general problem.
The United States, moreover, as many of the preceding notes have
Economist, June 12, 1993, at 31 ("Hillary Rodham Clinton has shifted at least some of her
attention [from health care reform] to other issues, such as the 'politics of meaning' ").
Redemptive politics' pretensions are softened in the guise of the "politics of meaning," but the
premise is still the same: that meaning is found within politics, and politics is thereby an end
in itself, self-referential.
Leon Wieseltier thoughtfully attacks this view in an important recent essay defending
religion and the withdrawal from.,modernity-defending, by implication, true civil society-in
American life following the Wacoflameout. See Leon Wieseltier, The True Fire: In Defense
of Spiritual Strangeness, The New Republic, May 17, 1993, at 25. The tension of American
left-liberalism is precisely that what makes it "left" and "radical" clamors for more
redemption through politics, while what is "liberal" denies that politics ever can be
redemptive, because in a liberal democracy, politics is always a mere means. As Wieseltier
points out, the American Founding Fathers abolished redemption as an end in American
politics. Id. at 26. The "left" and the "liberal" compromise, unsatisfactorily, on
"progressivism," the doctrine by which there is redemption through politics, and totality, but
only a little at a time.
100. Camus, supra note 51, at 306. Of "thin"people. The real problem, of course, is that
the bureaucratic assault on "civil society" in America means that too many people, from all
classes and all walks of life, have no community not sponsored by the state in which to seek
salvation or any clue what it might mean. These are the spiritually dislocated, the "thin
people." They lack an independent "conception of the good" that they might seek to realize,
because they have come to maturity in a political culture that has taught them to look out
solely for their material possessions and their right to happiness. Still, failure to achieve either
offers the consolations of litigation, in which lawyers are cast in their proper role as therapists
to a world in which the elements of personality are generated not by family psychodynamics
but by state bureaucracies.
When "thin people" look for something to do other than consumerist diversions, however,
they seek power; they naturally make politics their religion (lacking any other concept of what
religion might be but having strong ideas, like Michael Lerner, of all that politics might be)
and then seek their thin salvation in it. Alas, salvation in politics is not a solitary adventure;
the salvation of thin politicians requires that the rest of us go with them, willy-nilly,
dismantling what little remained of civil society in the process.
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emphasized,"° faces immense pressures concerning the status of
groups as groups and their supposed rights. Yugoslavia is thus
important for the analysis of America, even at those moments when
Yugoslavia's situation seems to revolve around factors singular to it,
such as Tito, worker self-management and, of course, the Serbs,
Croats, and Bosnians among others. But what is the Yugoslav lesson
for the United States?
One commonly expressed view is that the United States is a multicultural nation, just as Yugoslavia was a multicultural nation consisting of ancient tribes and tribal loyalties. There follow three
significant responses to this perceived situation. First, there is the
now politically incorrect "melting pot," wherein over time the tribes
dissolve. Second, there is the claim that the "gorgeous mosaic" is a
source of national strength rather than danger, but that cultural
diversity is, and ought to be, located in civil society and that the juridical object of the state should remain the individual, whatever his or
her tribal identity. Third, there is the claim that for reasons of historic justice or to avert tribal war or both, the United States ought to
manage relations between the tribes, majorities and minorities,
through rights assigned to groups, with the implication that the
proper juridical object of the state is the group, and that group identity
is primary to the definition of the individual.
The second of these responses might be called "soft multiculturalism," or perhaps "multiculturalism with a happy face"; it is the explanation offered by bureaucracies when seeking to make
multiculturalism unthreatening. The third could be called "hard multiculturalism"; it is what the multiculturalist doctrine is all about, viz.,
state intervention to "manage" civil society.
The Yugoslav experience is, however, ambiguous as a basis for recommending between these alternatives. For each who says the war
resulted from going down one of these paths,. there will always be
someone who says the problem was they did not go far enough. If
only, for example, Tito had truly smashed group identities rather than
only halfheartedly doing so. Or if only groupiidentity had been carried out as a state doctrine more thoroughly, to prohibit those of one
ethnic group from living in another's place, so that ethnic cleansing
would have no reason to occur. There are many possibilities.
It is more useful to see in Yugoslavia the differences between it and
the United States. The three responses above all share a common
assumption that there is tribalism in the United States. They share
101. See, e.g., supra notes 46, 91.
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the assumption that "tribalism" in the United States, like Yugoslavia,
has its roots in history and in the constitutive elements of civil society,
and that it is, somehow, threatening to modernity.
But nothing could be further from the truth. Nothing threatens
modernity in the United States; with the possible exceptions of the
Amish, the Hasidim, and a few outlaw Mormon polygamists, we, the
Americans, are made in the image of modernity. We have roots, to be
sure, but the claim that we have roots like the tribal roots of the
Balkans is as false-and seductive-as a Ralph Lauren ad.
Louis Menand is therefore correct to observe:
When the whole culture is self-consciously "diverse", real
diversity has disappeared .... People in the United States
still want.., to be "American." It is just that being American is now understood to mean wearing your ethnicity, religion, gender and sexual history-your "differences"-on
your sleeve.... This new method of national self-definition
has naturally heightened the degree of racial and cultural
conflict in American life, which is why it is common,
although misleading, to hear the United States spoken of as
though it were a society of discrete communities, or of competing identity groups. 102
Menand categorically denies that the "United States is becoming
increasingly diversified ethnically and culturally, so that where there
was once . . 3. a common culture . . . there is now a mass of
10
subcultures."
The claim of cultural diversity is thus little more than cover for the
essential cultural homogeneity. More precisely, it is the attempt to
sell new and culturally differentiated goods-some material, some ideological, some cultural-to a market saturated with homogeneity.
The worry of some conservative intellectuals that the United States is
descending into tribalism and premodernism is therefore misplaced. 1 4 In that sense, the sense of Yugoslavia, the United States
has no such past; cultural diversity in the United States is not really
cultural diversity, but rather cover for demanding political conformity-the political conformity of the "diversity" agenda. The political
102. Louis Menand, Being an American: How the United States is becoming less, not more
diverse, The Times (London), Oct. 30, 1992 (literary supp.), at 4.
103. Id. at 3.
104. See, e.g., the entire June 1993 issue, "Bosnia, U.S.A.," of Chronicles, the decidedly
conservative publication of the Rockford Institute.

1993]

ILLIBERAL TOLERANCE

abuses and risks are real enough, but solely as politics. 10 5 They have
little to do with a descent into premodern tribalism. America has no
premodernity and no tribes.
The United States is, instead, more like the situation Amartya Sen
described above of India, in which tribalism is invented-and in the
case of the United States, invented by government and bureaucracy,
and recently so. Groups, group entitlements, and group power are
created by the bureaucracy in the interest of creating client groups to
manage and service. It is as foolhardy a politics in the United States
as it has proved to be in India or Sri Lanka. But it is not culture or
civil society; it is politics and the state. More precisely, it is the state
filling the empty space once occupied by civil society, and filling it
with the simulacra of civil society, politicized forms and no
0 6
content.

XV.

ILLIBERAL TOLERANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Still, the preceding analysis of Yugoslavia's tribal system adopted
uncritically the assumption that the Yugoslav system was, at a minimum, modem in its aspirations and functioning. It did so in order to
attack the "normative" proposition that any form of modernity is
automatically desirable.' 0 7 With respect to the "descriptive" proposition° 8-- that it was modernist-Yugoslavia's federal system was
never in fact so very modem as it appeared. It dressed itself up in the
modernist language of communism. But the fundamental goal of the
system seems to have been less gradual progression to a modernist
reconstitution of individual identity, away from pre-modem group
identity, as suggested in the fable of "modernity progressing," and
more a thoroughly pre-modern balancing of power between pre-modem ethnic groups.
Put another way, the collapse of federal Yugoslavia was due partly
to the strains of a contradiction between a system committed in part
to modernity and certainly modernization, on the one hand, but committed to maintaining a pre-modem balancing of ethnic groups as
105. It could be argued, with some justification, that the successful merging of the
"personal" and the "political" means, however, that the risks are no longer strictly "political."
This merging of the personal and the political is precisely the condition of the state
"managing" civil society; everything it touches turns into politics-meaning, in the United
States, a lawsuit in the federal courts.
106. Or filling it, in other words, with Michael Lerner's "politics of meaning." See supra
note 99.
107. See supra section IX.
108. Id.
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such, a system of "illiberal tolerance," on the other. It was in some
respects a tolerant system, but its tolerance was pre-modern and fundamentally illiberal. The proof of its illiberalism was that it treated
deviant individuals so badly. In order to maintain the balance of
group relations, individuals who threatened to unbalance it had to be
smashed down absolutely. This is tolerance of groups and intolerance
of individuals; illiberalism and not liberalism. Contrary to the fable of
modernity progressing, smashing deviant individuals was not done to
root out pre-modern group identity, but rather for the purpose of
maintaininggroup identities-but in careful balance. Federal Yugoslavia was committed simultaneously to a modernist conception of
individuals as the proper object of the state, and a pre-modern conception of ethnic groups as the proper object of the state.
The contradiction could be lived with so long as geopolitical pressures from the outside made it imperative to stay together and economic assistance operated as a palliative. When those conditions
changed, the federal state was revealed as fundamentally untenable.
Those who tried to save federal Yugoslavia as a guarantor of modernist identity against the tribes-the courageous Yugoslav lawyers
Tanja Petovar or Srdja Popovic, for example, or the anti-war activist
Sonia Licht-found themselves decisively outmaneuvered by the
nationalists.
Parts of the system were strongly modern to be sure, and particularly the creeping bureaucratization of everything. Indeed, the political and economic deadlock produced in the course of the 1970s and
1980s by the system of decentralized "self-management" was a study
of what happens when a modern bureaucracy is carried all the way to
its logical extreme. Nothing at all could happen, and a quite plausible
alternative explanation of what happened in Yugoslavia is simply that
war was the only way to break the deadlock produced by the bureaucracy, without reference to ethnicity or anything else. The war, seen
in this light, becomes a modern war, fought against a modern conundrum in which assertions of ethnicity are epiphenomenal upon
bureaucracy. While this is an extreme and exaggerated view, it too
deserves a place at the crowded table of explanations for what went
awry in Yugoslavia.
The inability to deal with the contradiction in the federal Yugoslav
state, a contradiction fundamentally about, as this essay has stressed
again and again, the properjuridicalobject of the state, whether modem individual or pre-modern ethnic group, was compounded by certain key confusions. The first was a confusion of decentralization
with democracy. It may seem obvious today that decentralization in
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Yugoslavia was simply a means of transforming Leviathan into Behemoth, a means of diverting abusive state power from a single source
into many hands, but without constraining it under the rule of law.
Yet Human Rights Watch during the late 1980s found itself continually having to remind observers inside and outside of Yugoslavia
that transferring power from the center to the republics, to local companies, to local party committees, to local bureaucrats, might be an
interesting academic contrast to the Stalinist model, but it scarcely
constituted liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law. On the contrary, accountability became ever more elusive across Yugoslavia,
whether in criminal trials in which the outcomes were clearly fixed
but never clearly by whom, or, as federal Yugoslavia learned to its
sorrow, in critical economic matters, which became entrapped like a
fly in the amber of local politics.
The second confusion was, if anything, more profound. This was a
confusion of "tolerance" and "liberalism." It was assumed, more or
less, that any form of ethnic tolerance automatically had to be "liberal" tolerance. Perhaps, in light of the tragedy unfolding today, the
distinction between liberal tolerance, founded on the freedom of the
individual, and illiberal tolerance, founded on pre-modern group identity and its privileges, is obvious. It was not in the late 1980s-just as
it is not, in the 1990s, in the United States. I had many conversations
on behalf of Human Rights Watch with members of one or another
diplomatic mission, journalists, and academics in which I was repeatedly told, as one American diplomat put it, that "Yugoslavia has done
as good a job as anywhere in the world in holding together the multicultural ideal. It's done a heck of a lot better job than other places,
maybe even the United States, accommodating its ethnic minorities
and promoting tolerance." The problem, of course, is that the "multicultural ideal" is a flat and dangerous contradiction, even sentimentalized, as in the United States, into an ideal of justice.
I said earlier that the Yugoslav federal contradiction lay in defining
both the modem individual and the pre-modem group as the proper
juridical objects of the state. The contradiction was embedded in the
1974 federal constitution, which parceled out rights on the basis of
individual identity, but also on the basis of ethnicity. The clash
between modem and pre-modem was masked slightly by the fact that
the constitutional language referred to "republics" and "nations,"
rather than ethnicity directly, but in fact there was never a question
that ethnicity was the touchstone. The contradiction is formal. Article 1 of the 1974 Constitution declares the equal rights of "nations
and nationalities" even while talking of individual rights and liber-
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ties."° Moreover, the constitution deploys these pre-modern categories in the service of the equality of subjects, thus putting a modernist
gloss over the essential categorization.
Despite the juridical masks, however, the statal object was at least
as much the tribe as the modem individual. The latter, the individual,
is the basis for liberal tolerance; the former may be a basis for tolerance, but not one rooted in liberalism. I might here have said "not
one rooted in modernity," but I seek to emphasize the presumptive
and, I suggest, unwarranted connection in the minds of Western liberals between tolerance and liberalism. The Roman Empire was
unabashedly tolerant as well; tolerance is not a warrant of modernity
or liberalism. Indeed, the "tolerance" proposed by some European
intellectuals as a means of preserving the ethnic peace of Europe is
explicitly rooted in the anti-individualist, anti-liberal writings of the
German conservative Carl Schmitt.110
XVI.

AND THE WAR CAME

The practical question can still be asked-what is so terrible about
"illiberal" tolerance if tolerance and social peace are the result? Does
it matter whether the sources are modern or pre-modern, liberal or
illiberal, if the result is "right"? It will not do simply to point at the
war in former Yugoslavia as the "inevitable" result of an attempt to
gain tolerance through illiberal means. This is partly because the
causes of the war are too multiple, and partly because even the explanation I am urging here attributes the breakdown of the system of
ethnic peace to a contradictionbetween the system's modern and premodern attributes.
But it is possible, and indeed inevitable, to answer that the world is
now modern, or at least modern enough to guarantee that there will
be a contradiction. It is no longer the world of the Roman Empire or
the Ottoman Empire or even the Hapsburgs. Even in Saudi Arabia,
after all, women attempt to drive cars or appear in public without a

veil, knowing full well they may be beaten up and tortured and jailed.
Modernity is here to stay, and therefore the contradiction is forced.
Where the choice between modern and pre-modern is forced upon the
state, even in the matter of the sources of its commitment to tolerance,
then it seems to me clear that the state must make its object the mod109. Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974, art. 1, reprinted in
Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert Flanz eds., special
supp. 1979).
110. See supra note 55.
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em, the universal, and the individual. That is the lesson for Yugoslavia; the state must choose not only the modem, but the individual.
The lesson for the United States is that the state must choose the
individual and give up the management of civil society: the adventure
always winds up badly.
But then I am a modem, a liberal, and an individualist, at least with
respect to the attributes, relations, subjects, and objects of the state.
Not everybody is.

